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NOTE
Fair Value or Prudent Investment as a Rate Base in Pennsylvania?
A Conflict Between the Public Utility Commission and the
Superior Court
INTRODUCTION
The genesis of public utility rate-making lies in two economic facts.
First, the services rendered by a utility are in universal and relatively
unvarying demand. Second, public utilities are, either by virtue of special
privileges granted by the state or because of prior appropriation of the
market, monopolies within the area of their operation.' Before the advent
of regulation, it was their practice to take advantage of this situation and
reap enormous profits by charging as much as the traffic would bear.
Inevitably the consumers rebelled and legislative action was taken to curb
their exploitation.2 In the early stages direct legislative rate-fixing was
sustained by the courts.3 However this proved unwieldy and the regu-
latory power was delegated to more efficient commissions. 4 The eager-
ness of the regulatory bodies to protect the consumer interests eventually
produced a situation where the utility had lost most of its monopoly ad-
vantages and was, in many cases, less able to show a profit than enter-
prises whose prices were to some extent regulated by competition. It was
at this point that the Supreme Court, in Smyth v. Ames,5 declared that a
utility was entitled to just compensation for the use of its property, saying:
"We hold . . . that the basis of all calculations as to the reason-
ableness of rates to be charged by a corporation maintaining a high-
way under legislative sanction must be the fair value of the property
being used by it for the convenience of the public." 6
Smyth v. Ames marks the beginning of modern public utility rate regu-
lation. Although its original purpose was merely the declaration of gen-
eral principles of judicial review on the question of due process, 7 the deci-
sion has been adopted by the courts as the formula that commissions must
use in establishing rates. Thus rates are computed to yield an allowed
return, which is itself the sum of the allowable operating expenses, taxes
1. See TRox.LL, EcoNoMIcs OF PUBLIC UTILITIEs 8-11, 25-44 (1947); BAUER
AND GOLD, PUBLIC UTILITY VALUATION FOR PUROSES OF RATE CONTROL 3-8 (1934).
2. See, for example, the various Granger laws.
3. E. g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876) ; Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Iowa,
94 U.S. 155 (1876) ; Peik v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 94 U.S. 164 (1876).
4. E.g., The Interstate Commerce Act, 24 STAT. 379 (1887), as amended 49
U.S.C. § 1 (1946).
5. 169 U.S. 466 (1898); cf. Chicago, M. & S.P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418
(1890).
6. Smyth v. Ames, supra note 5 at 546. (Emphasis added).
7. TROXmL, op. cit. mtpra note 1, at 264-265.
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and annual depreciation, plus an adequate return for the investor. This
last is a percentage (generally from five to eight per cent, depending on
the risk involved and the prevailing rate of return in other enterprises)
of the "fair value" of the property or "rate base.". Although there has
been a tendency in recent years for courts to look at the reasonableness
of the total effect of the process,8 a commission, in order to carry out its
part of the job, must determine each separate element properly. By far
the most difficult part of the task is the ascertainment of the rate base.
It is the purpose of this Note to trace the methods used by the Pennsyl-
vania Public Utility Commission in determining the proper rate base and
analyze the reaction of the courts to these methods.
THE FEDERAL BACKGROUND
Any discussion of the nature of fair value must start with an analysis
of the pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the United States, since
the concept originated there and since it is, on the issue of confiscation,
the court of last resort. The essence of the problem stems from the appli-
cation of dictum in Smyth v. Ames that, to ascertain the fair value of a
utility,
"the original cost of construction, the amount expended in permanent
improvements, the amount and market value of its bonds and stock,
the present as compared with the original cost of construction, the
probable earning capacity of the property under particular rates pre-
scribed by statute, and the sum required to meet operating expenses,
are all matters for consideration and are to be given such weight as
may be just and right in each case." 9
This statement formed the basis of all judicial review of rate-making
for the next thirty years and was enacted into law as part of the Pennsyl-
vania Public Service Company Law of 1913.10
The Trend Toward Reproduction Cost.-Justice Harlan's reasoning
in Smyth v. Ames appears to have been based partly on earlier eminent
domain cases interpreting the requirement of "just compensation" for the
taking of property." The normal test of just compensation in eminent
domain cases is the market value of the property 12 and, where the prop-
erty taken is a business, evidence of earnings is relevant in determining
8. E.g., FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944) ; Colorado
Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581, 589 (1945).
9. 169 U.S., at 546, 547.
10. Act of July 26, 1913, P.L. 1374, Art. V, § 20, repealed, PA. STAT. ANN.,
tit. 66, § 1562 (Purdon, 1941).
11. See Hale, Does the Ghost of Smyth v. Ames Still Walk?, 55 HARv. L. REv.
111-1123 (1942) ; BAUER AND GOLD, op. cit. suipra note 1, at 56-60; 2 BONBRIGHT,
THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY, 1094-1097 (1937). The confusion is perhaps more
apparent in the lower court opinion. See Ames v. Union Pac. Ry., 64 Fed. 165,
177 (C.C.D. NEB. 1894).
12. ORGEI, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOmAIN 55 (1936); 1
BONBRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 11, at 411 et seq.
that value.13 In rate-making, however, the earnings themselves are under
scrutiny, and any rate base which capitalizes earnings under existing rates
is totally useless; the present rates, no matter how excessive, can never
be reduced.' 4 Courts and commissions have, therefore, almost universally
excluded probable earning power and market value of securities from con-
sideration in determining fair value.' 5 To ascertain present value, they
have turned to something less obviously dependent on earnings. This
substitute value is cost, particularly reproduction cost, i.e., the cost of re-
producing the present plant at the present time.' 6
When Smyth v. Ames was decided, and for about fifteen years there-
after, prices were at a low ebb.' 7 Consequently utilities whose property
was constructed before the decline argued eloquently in favor of original
cost as the measure of fair value. The consumers, on the other hand,
pressed for the lower reproduction cost. Although the court was inclined
to follow those commissions which tended to fix fair value on the basis
of reproduction cost,' 8 it did not commit itself to any definite formula.' 9
No case rejected original cost because of the drop in prices; the chief
obstacles were apparently the extravagance of early investments and the
lack of accounting records. 20 The lack of such records led to an appraisal
of the utility's property under present prices and, as a rule, this present
value and original cost were not too far apart.2' There is some indication
that the commissions thought of fair value as found as the amount prudently
invested in utility property and intended to use it, with later additions at
actual cost, as the rate base for future proceedings.22  Despite this indica-
tion, the Supreme Court made only two modifications of the rule of Smyth
13. See ORGEL, op. cit. sitpra note 12 at 708-717, which points out that, even
in eminent domain cases, earnings are not regarded as the primary factor.
14. To take a simple case, assume that Utility X is organized in 1949 with assets
which cost $100,000. A year later its rates come under scrutiny and the Commission
determines that it should earn 6% on the fair value of the property. For the year
past its earnings have been sufficient to give a $12,000 return. If fair value is ob-
tained by capitalizing earnings under the formula
6% return
cost on cost
fair value actual return
the rate base will be $200,000, and the utility must continue to receive $12,000 a year
to earn a 6% return. If, however, cost is used as the rate base, it may readily be
seen that the utility is earning $6,000 more than is necessary.
15. See TROXEL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 265. But cf. Denver Union Stock Yard
v. United States, 304 U.S. 470, 479 (1938).
16. See Hale, op cit. supra note 11, at 1122-1123.
17. BAUER AND GoLD, op. cit. supra note 1, at 63.
18. San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Jasper, 189 U.S. 439 (1903); Knoxville v.
Knoxville Water Co., 212 U.S. 1 (1909) ; Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S.
19 (1909) ; Cedar Rapids Gas Light Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 223 U.S. 655 (1912).
19. Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 434 (1913).
20. See Id. at 454; San Diego Land & Town Co. v, Jasper, 189 U.S. 439, 442-
443 (1903). See BAUER AND GoLD, op. cit. supra note 1, at 63-66.
21. BAUER AND GoLD, op. cit. supra note 1, at 63.
22. Id. at 74-76.
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v. Ames during this period. It rejected figures derived from earnings as
measures of fair value,23 and in the Knoxville case it declared that in deter-
mining fair value there must be a deduction for the depreciation from age
and use.
24
With the advent of World War I, the gradually developing valuation
policy of the commissions was interrupted. Beginning in 1915, price levels
rose rapidly. In 1920 the average price level was 150% above that of
1913. This was followed by a sharp downward trend with prices eventually
settling about 75% above the pre-war level.25  Commissions turned from
rate reduction to consideration of rate increases. In passing on the in-
creases, courts were inclined to favor reproduction cost as-a basis, but
they at first adopted the average of prices over a period rather than
the supposedly abnormal prices prevailing at the time of the valuation.2 6
In the Southwestern Bell case, however, the Supreme Court took judicial
notice of the continuing high prices and declared that in order to make a
forecast of values for the future, consideration of present reproduction costs
was necessary.27 Although the decision is perhaps most noteworthy for
the vigorous and realistic dissent by Justice Brandeis, it is significant as
a definite adoption of reproduction cost as a dominant factor in deter-
mining fair value. Subsequent decisions followed the same pattern,28 and
the climax was reached in the McCardle case 29 where the court, although
paying lip service to Smyth v. Ames, based the decision almost exclusively
on reproduction cost new less observed depreciation. Furthermore, the
court abandoned the notion that prices would return to "normal" and
stated that reproduction cost should be calculated from present rather than
average prices.30
Modern Rate-Making Theories.-Justice Brandeis' dissent in the
Southwestern Bell case attacked the rule of Smyth v. Ames and the em-
phasis on reproduction cost as economically unsound.31 What the investor
devotes to the public use is not, according to him, the specific property,
whose value fluctuates with the change of p'rices and diminishes as deprecia-
tion takes effect, but an ascertainable amount of capital. He is entitled
to receive a return on the amount of capital prudently invested in the enter-
prise, and no more. Such a rate base would be definite, permanent, and
23. Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 47 (1909).
24. Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U.S. 1, 9 (1909).
25. BAUEa AND GOLD, op. cit. supra note 1, at 77.
26. Galveston Elec. Co. v. Galveston, 258 U.S. 388 (1922). The theory was that
prices would eventually settle at a figure somewhere between the present and past
prices.
27. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission, 262 U.S.
276, 287, 288 (1923).
28. See Bluefield Waterworks v. Public Service Commission, 262 U.S. 679, 692
(1923) ; St. Louis & O'Fallon R.R. v. United States, 279 U.S. 461, 487 (1929).
29. McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400 (1926).
30. Id. at 408-412.
31. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission, supra note
27, at 290.
high enough to yield the investor an adequate return, 32 without allowing
him to reap profits on money he never invested.
In spite of the cogency of Justice Brandeis arguments, the Supreme
Court by 1930 seemed definitely committed to a reproduction cost rate
base. However, the financial collapse in 1929 brought about a re-exam-
ination of and ultimately a change in the court's position. The first break
in the McCardle rule was the Los Angeles Gas case in 1933.13  The
California Commission had considered two valuations, one based on his-
torical cost undepreciated, 34 and the other based on reproduction cost less
accrued depreciation. Under the proposed rates, the return would have
been 7.7 per cent on the former and 7 per cent on the latter figure. Even
though the commission's order was based on historical cost, the Supreme
Court sustained the rates as set. Chief Justice Hughes stated that the
Court would not interfere unless confiscation of the utility's property were
clearly established.3 5 The following year, the court sustained an original
cost valuation of a bridge by the Pennsylvania Public Service Commission,36
and, in the Lindheimer3 7 and Dayton 38 cases pointed out the absurdities
reached by reproduction cost valuations.
In recent years, in cases decided under the Natural Gas Act of 1938,39
the Supreme Court has declared that the Federal Power Commission need
not consider reproduction cost.40  However, it is not exactly clear just
what standards the Court will apply.41 The concurring justices in the
Pipeline case felt that the time had come to adopt prudent investment as
a rate base. In the Hope case, a rate base of actual legitimate cost less
accrued depreciation was sustained. The court, speaking through Justice
Douglas, declared that "it is not theory but the impact of the rate order
which counts." 4 Justice Jackson, sensing the lack of any rational rela-
32. Sufficient fluidity to attract risk capital would be obtained by varying the rate
of return, a much easier matter.
33. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Railroad Commission, 289 U.S. 287 (1933).
34. Historical cost means cost when first acquired by the utility in question.
35. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Railroad Commission, supra note 33, at
304-305.
36. Clark's Ferry Bridge Co. v. PSC, 291 U.S. 227 (1934). The effect of the
decision is somewhat lessened by the fact that the bridge was comparatively new.
37. Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 292 U.S. 151, 161-164 (1934). Although
the company had always paid substantial dividends, the lower court found that the
old rates were grossly confiscatory under the fair value rule.
38. Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 292 U.S. 290, 311-
312 (1934). The company sought an increase that would have given approximately
a one per cent return on the fair value of the property.
39. 52 STAT. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1946). Section 6 provides: "(a) The
Commission may investigate and ascertain the actual legitimate cost of the property
of every natural-gas company, the depreciation therein, and, when found necessary for
rate-making purposes, other facts which bear on the determination of such cost or
depreciation and the fair value of such property." (Emphasis added.) The statutory
language indicates that Congress felt that consideration of reproduction cost might no
longer be required by due process.
40. E.g., FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 605 (1944); FPC v.
Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 606 (1942) (concurring opinion).
41. See Id. at 386. See Fisher, What Says the Court? Criteria for Utility Regu-
lation, 44 P.U. FoRa. 856 (1949). And see Hale, op. cit. sapra note 11, at 1129-1140.
42. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., supra note 40, at 602.
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tion between the original cost of gas lease-holds and their present value,
would go even further and exclude consideration of rate base in any way
in cases such as this.43  And, to complicate the problem still further, at
least three members of the court have indicated, a willingness to leave the
question of adequacy of rates to the commissions and review only the
propriety of the procedure. 4 - It appears that the majority is not yet willing
to go so far. A utility is still protected if the total effect of the rate order
is confiscatory.45
The above survey indicates that the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court on the question of rate base fall into two groups. The
earlier, from Smyth v. Ames down to the McCardle case, shows the focus
on fair value and reproduction cost; the later group, from the Los Angeles
Gas case to the present, reflects the shift toward original cost and prudent
investment. The decisions by the Pennsylvania courts on the question do
not, however, reveal a similar division. Both courts and commission, in
working with the Public Service Company Law, followed the United
States Supreme Court. Yet when the Pennsylvania legislature, spurred
on by the trend of federal decisions, enacted a new law designed to estab-
lish prudent investment in Pennsylvania, the Superior Court overturned
all attempts by the Commission to follow the legislative lead and adhered
closely to the pattern of decisions under Smyth v. Ames.
THE FIRST EFFECTIVE ATTEMPT AT REGULATION IN PENNSYLVANIA-
1913-1937
Regulation of public utilities prior to the passage of the Public Service
Company Act of 1913 was haphazard and often ineffective.40 To combat
this situation, the 1913 Act provided for the general regulation of all phases
of public utility activity by the Public Service Commission.4 The Com-
mission was authorized to determine "just, due, equal, and reasonable
rates," 48 and to ascertain for this purpose the fair value of the utility's
property.49 The act carefully spelled out the criteria the Commission was
43. Id. at 645-660 (dissenting opinion) ; see Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 324 U.S.
581, 612-615 (1945) (concurring opinion).
44. Justices Frankfurter, Black, Douglas, and Murphy. See Driscoll v. Edison
Light & Power Co., 309 U.S. 104, 122 (1939) (concurring opinion); FPC v. Natural
Gas Pipeline Co., .mupra note 40, at 606-607 (dissenting opinion). See also Hale,
op. cit. mtpra note 11, at 1130-1140.
45. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581, 605 (1945).
46. See BucxwALTmE, TEE VALUATION PROCEDURE FOR RATE MAKING OF THE
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF PENNSYLVANIA, 11-55, 309 (1942).
47. Act of July 26, 1913, P.L. 1374.
48. Act of July 26, 1913, P.L. 1374, Art. V, § 3, superseded by PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 66, § 1141 (Purdon, 1941).
49. Neither the Act of 1913 nor the present Public Utility Law specifically require
a finding of fair value, but it is virtually impossible for the Commission to fix dates
without making a valuation because of the fair value rule of Smyth v. Ames. The prac-
tice of the commissions has been to make a definite finding of fair value when it is im-
posing rates on the utility which the utility claims are confiscatory and to refrain
from making a finding when the rates sought by the utility are upheld. See New
Street Bridge Co. v. PSC, 271 Pa. 19, 38, 114 AtI. 378, 384 (1921) ; Philadelphia v.
PSC, 84 Pa. Super. 135, 144 (1924); Perkasie Sewer Co. v. PUC, 142 Pa. Super.
262, 265, 16 A.2d 158, 160 (1940).
to use in ascertaining fair value, following almost word for word the
language of Smyth v. Ames.50 As a result, the history of decisions inter-
preting the Public Service Company Act closely parallels the history of
decisions by the United States Supreme Court on the question of con-
fiscation. As the climate of opinion on the Supreme Court shifted more
and more towards the requirements of a reproduction cost rate base, re-
production cost played an ever increasing part in the valuations by the
Public Service Commission. Thus the Superior Court was able to say
in the Solar case:
"From Smyth v. Ames . .. , down to and including R. R. Com-
mission of California v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. . . ., and
throughout the decisions of our Supreme Court and of this court, the
cost of reproducing the property has consistently been held to be not
only a relevant but also an essential element in the ascertainment of
its 'fair value' for rate-making purposes." 51
Despite its dependency upon reproduction cost as a primary test of
fair value, the Public Service Commission did not commit itself to any
single formula.52 Occasionally, it made use of its authority to consider
other elements of value, though the role that these elements played is
somewhat confusing and open to questioii. For example, the Commission
referred to the size of the plant, the extent of the distribution system, and
the number of consumers in arriving at a rate base for a water company.5 3
50. Act of July 26, 1913, P.L. 1374, Art. V, § 20(a) : "The commission shall
have power upon application or upon its own motion, to ascertain and determine the
fair value of the property of every public service company in this Commonwealth,
and to determine any matter in connection therewith; and shall exercise the said
power whenever the same is required, or whenever it shall deem such valuation or
determination necessary or proper under any of the provisions of this act.
"In ascertaining and determining such fair value the commission may determine
every fact, matter, or thing which, in its judgment, does or may have any bearing on
such value; and may take into consideration, among other things, the original cost
of construction, particularly with reference to the amount expended in the existing
and useful permanent improvements; with such consideration for the amount in mar-
ket value of its bonds and stocks, the probable earning capacity of the company under
the particular rates prescribed by statute or ordinance, or other municipal contract,
or fixed or proposed by the commission, and for the items of expenditures for obsolete
equipment and construction, as the circumstances and the historical development of
the enterprise may warrant; the reproduction costs of the property, based upon the
fair average prices of materials, property, and labor, and the developmental and going
concern value of such public service company; and these, and any other elements of
value, shall be given such weight by the commission as may be just and right in each
case." See Beaver Valley Water Co. v. PSC, 76 Pa. Super. 255, 258-260 (1921).
51. Solar Electric Co. v. PUC, 137 Pa. Super. 325, 344, 9 A.2d 447, 456 (1939).
52. See BuCKWALIER, op. cit. supra note 46, at 76-78. Frequently the Commis-
sion made "allowances" for various items without indicating what the particular
amount allowed was. See e.g., Elwood v. Elwood Water Co., 5 Pa. P.S.C. 214, 217
(1921); Meyersdale v. Meyersdale Light, Heat & Power Co., 5 Pa. P.S.C. 545, 547
(1921). This practice was condemned by the Superior Court in Scranton-Spring
Brook Water Co. v. PSC, 105 Pa. Super. 203, 209, 211, 160 Atl. 230, 233, 234 (1932).
However, since in many cases the Commission was dealing with going value, failure
to set a specific figure was perhaps justifiable. See TRoxzE, op. cit. supra note 1, at
320.
53. Harbster v. Angelica Water & Ice Co., 3 Pa. P.S.C. 469 (1918).
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A year later, in fixing the fair value of an electric company, it emphasized
the character of the community, the utility's prospects for the future, and
the "judicious investment" of the original owners.
54 In neither of these
cases was a specific value assigned to any of these elements.
5 It would
appear that none could be found, for these items properly speaking have
no place in fair value beyond the extent to which they are already included
in the original cost or reproduction cost figures for the physical plant. If
they are to be given any additional weight in the rate-making process,
they should be used only in determining the rate of return, one factor in
which is the utility's efficiency in serving the public. The Commission's
use of these items, however, closely resembles capitalizing the utility's
present earning power.56
The Role of Reproduction Cost.-On the whole, extraneous elements
such as those referred to above played a very small part in the Commis-
sion's valuation standards; 57 reproduction cost was almost always the
major factor. In the earlier cases, the Commission seemed to favor a
composite rate base, giving consideration to both original and reproduction
cost.58 Five-year average prices were adopted in determining reproduc-
tion cost; 9 the Commission considered spot prices dangerous in a period
of rising prices, but felt that ten-year average prices would unduly favor
the consumer. 60 In one case it indicated an inclination towards the split-
inventory method.61  In 1923, the Commission, following the Supreme
Court of the United States, moved towards a reproduction cost base.
62
After 1926 spot prices were used, not because of a feeling that the average
price system was defective, but rather because the Commission felt that
54. Rose v. Mercersburg, Lebmaster & Markes Elec. Co., 4 Pa. P.S.C. 131
(1919).
55. See BUcKWALTER, op. cit. supra note 46, at 82-84.
56. See TROXELI, op. cit. .spra note 1, at 379, with regard to the role of these
items in the rate of return. The intangible element of value in these items is akin to
good-will, which was rejected as an element of fair value in Ben Avon Borough v.
Ohio Valley Water Co., 68 Pa. Super. 561, 588 (1917).
57. They are significant chiefly as an indication of an inclination towards a value
rather than an investment basis of rate regulation.
58. E.g., Ben Avon Borough v. Ohio Valley Water Co., 2 Pa. P.S.C. 733, 766
(917) ; Apollo v. Apollo Water Works, 4 Pa. P.S.C. 360, 365 (1919) ; Allied Print-
ing Trades Council v. Scranton Ry., 5 Pa. P.S.C. 180, 192 (1921).
59. Harbster v. Angelica Water and Ice Co., 3 Pa. P.S.C. 469 (1918) ; Browns-
ville v. Brownsville Water Co., 4 Pa. P.S.C. 239 (1919) ; Verona v. Suburban Water
Co., 4 Pa. P.S.C. 748, 753 (1920); Meyersdale v. Meyersdale Elec. Light, Heat &
Power Co., 5 Pa. P.S.C. 545 (921).
60. Hanover v. Conewago Gas Co., 5 Pa. P.S.C. 634 (1922) ; Caufliel v. Johns-
town Water Co., 5 Pa. P.S.C. 718 (1922). When five-year estimates were unavail-
able, ten-year averages were used rather than spot prices. Doud v. Mansfield Water
Co., 5 Pa. P.S.C. 668 (1922).
61. Erie v. Buffalo & Lake Erie Traction Co., 4 Pa. P.S.C. 782, 789 (1920).
Fair value was fixed on a compromise basis. See BUCKWALTER, op. cit. supra note 46,
at 129. The split-inventory method involves valuation of the older part of the prop-
erty at reproduction cost and recent additions at original cost.
62. Philadelphia v. Phila. Rapid Transit Co., 6 Pa. P.S.C. 431, 438, 441 (1923);
Hall v. Leighton Water Co., 6 Pa. P.S.C. 768 (1924). The shift was in part caused
by the decision in Mercersburg, Lehmasters & Markes Elec. Co. v. PSC, 76 Pa.
Super. 58 (1921) which reversed a Commission decision that gave too much weight
to original cost. See also Lewistown v. PSC, 80 Pa. Super. 528, 532 (1923).
prices had become stabilized.6 3 For several years after the price drop in
1929 reproduction cost at spot prices continued to be the basis of valua-
tions, although the Commission turned to a split-inventory method to avoid
depressed rate bases. In the Chambersburg case,6 4 the Commission used
1929 spot prices on property owned at that time with additions since then
at actual cost. However, in 1939, in the Scranton-Spring case,6 5 the Com-
mission applied index figures to a 1928 reproduction cost estimate to get a
trended reproduction cost. Net additions since 1928 were added at actual
cost. As a rule, the Public Service Commission and the Pennsylvania
courts agreed on the weight given to reproduction costs and on the methods
used to determine them.6 6 For the most part they both adhered to the
decisions of the United States Supreme Court,67 following that body in
its inclination to the adoption of reproduction cost as the absolute test
under the McCardle rule.
Original Cost.-In early decisions the Public Service Commission
gave considerable weight to original cost, which it defined as "the cost of
the properties where first dedicated to public use." 68 There are indica-
tions that reproduction cost was adopted chiefly because of deficiencies
in accounting records. 69 In 1919 there was a definite tendency to adopt
original cost.70 The Commission, however, would not accept book cost
or estimates of original cost based on reproduction costs at the time of
construction, since these were likely not to reflect the actual investment
in property.71 In cases where the property had been constructed recently,
the Commission favored original cost as better evidence of value than
speculative reproduction cost estimates.72 However, the Superior Court,
already indicating what its attitude toward the Public Utility Commission's
attempt to establish prudent investment would be, was consistently op-
63. Columbia v. Columbia Water Co., 9 Pa. P.S.C. 595 (1929); Grove City v.
Union Heat & Light Co., 11 Pa. P.S.C. 792 (1933); Susquehanna Depot v. Cana-
wacta Water Supply Co., 12 Pa. P.S.C. 105 (1933). See BUCKWALTE, op. cit. szpra
note 46, at 142, 143.
64. Chambersburg v. Chambersburg Gas Co., 11 Pa. P.S.C. 583 (1932).
65. Scranton v. Scranton-Spring Brook Water Service Co., 13 Pa. P.S.C. 1, 235
(1934).
66. Chambersburg Gas Co. v. PSC, 116 Pa. Super. 196, 176 Atl. 794 (1935);
Scranton-Spring Brook Water Service Co. v. PSC, 119 Pa. Super. 117, 181 Atl. 77
(1935).
67. See, e.g., Ben Avon Borough v. Ohio Valley Water Co., supra note 56, at 577.
68. Thayer v. Beaver Valley Water Co., 2 Pa. P.S.C. 430, 433 (1916). See also
Ben Avon Borough v. Ohio Valley Water Co., 2 Pa. P.S.C. 969 (1917).
69. Plymouth v. Wikes-Barre Ry., 4 Pa. P.S.C. 722, 724 (1920); Parker v.
Sinking Spring Water Co., 4 Pa. P.S.C. 609, 611 (1920). See BucKwALTER, op. cit.
supr note 46, at 152.
70. Renfrew v. Fayetteville Water Co., 4 Pa. P.S.C. 232, 236 (1919); Fox v.
Pine Grove Elec. Light Co., 4 Pa. P.S.C. 292, 297 (1919) ; Heckert and Header v.
Hegins Water Co., 4 Pa. P.S.C. 283 (1919).
71. Verona v. Suburban Water Co., 4 Pa. P.S.C. 748, 750 (1920). However,
when original cost was not ascertainable, estimates of historical cost were considered.
Waynesburg v. Waynesburg Water Co., 5 Pa. P.S.C. 745, 748 (1922).
72. Philadelphia v. Phila. Rapid Transit Co., 6 Pa. P.S.C. 431, 438 (1923);
Herring v. Clark's Ferry Bridge Co., 8 Pa. P.S.C. 61, 65 (1926).
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posed to emphasis on original cost on the ground that it was a poor measure
of the present value.73
Par Value of Outstanding Securities.-The Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania, in two cases decided before the Act of 1913 took effect, declared
that rates would be reasonable if the utility earned a fair return upon the
investment in it.7 4 However, the Commission seldom used the amount of
the outstanding securities in fixing fair value. 5 The principal reason for
considering data on the costs of plant construction more satisfactory was
the fact that many utilities had securities of an amount far in excess of
any figure which could be assigned to the tangible property. For example,
in the Beaver Valley case the Commission found original cost to be
$1,159,000, depreciated reproduction cost $983,161, and outstanding securi-
ties $2,247,000; fair value was set at $985,000.76 In the Pittsburgh Rail-
ways case the original and reproduction cost estimates were identical-
$49,324,000-but the figure found for outstanding securities was
$156,000,000. 77 However, where overcapitalization or undercapitalization
was not evident, the Commission gave some weight to the amount of securi-
ties. In the Perkasie case, fair value was fixed at $50,000. The amount
found for outstanding securities was $46,606, and reproduction cost was
estimated at $81,197.78 In one case market value of securities appears to
have been a factor.7
9
Accrued Depreciation.-Following decisions by the United States
Supreme Court stemming from the Knoxville case,s0 the Public Service
Commission consistently held that accrued depreciation must be deducted
from reproduction cost in ascertaining fair value.8 ' In its treatment of
original cost, however, the Commission was not so certain that deprecia-
tion should be deducted; certainly depreciated original cost was never a
significant factor in fair value as finally found.8 2  Furthermore, in a few
cases undepreciated original cost was accorded considerable weight.8 The
73. Ben Avon Borough v. Ohio Valley Water Co., supra note 56, at 578; Mer-
cersburg Elec. Co. v. PSC, 76 Pa. Super. 58, 65 (1921); Erie v. PSC, 278 Pa. 512,
123 Atl. 471 (1924). See BUCKWALTER, op. cit. spra note 46 at 161.
74. Brymer v. Butler Water Co., 179 Pa. 231, 251, 36 Atl. 249, 251 (1897) ; Turtle
Creek Borough v. Penna. Water Co., 243 Pa. 401, 414, 90 Atl. 194, 198 (1914).
75. BUcKWALTER, op. cit. supra note 46, at 170.
76. Thayer v. Beaver Valley Water Co., 2 Pa. P.S.C. 430, 435, 439, 459 (1917).
77. Pittsburgh v. Pittsburgh Rys., 4 Pa. P.S.C. 479, 492, 494 (1920).
78. Perkasie v. Perkasie Sewer Co., 5 Pa. P.S.C. 243 (1921). See also Browns-
ville v. Brownsville Water Co., 4 Pa. P.S.C. 239 (1919) ; Mount Holly Springs v.
Mount Holly Water Co., 4 Pa. P.S.C. 325 (1920); Verona v. Suburban Water Co.,
4 Pa. P.S.C. 748 (1920).
79. Bloomsburg v. Bloomsburg Water Co., 4 Pa. P.S.C. 580, 586 (1920).
80. Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., supra note 24.
81. E.g., PSC v. Cheltenham and Abington Sewerage Co., 14 Pa. P.S.C. 76,
86 (1935); Plymouth v. Wilkes-Barre Ry. 4 Pa. P.S.C. 722, 724 (1920).
82. Hall v. Lehighton Water Supply Co., 6 Pa. P.S.C. 768 (1924); Casanave v.
Overbrook Steam Heat Co., 7 Pa. P.S.C. 397 (1925).
83. E.g., Lehighton v. New Parryville Consolidated Gas Co., 5 Pa. P.S.C. 809,
811 (1922); Brubaker v. Millersburg Home Water Co., 8 Pa. P.S.C. 193, 195
(1926).
failure to deduct accrued depreciation in these cases was apparently the
result of a slight inclination toward an invested capital rate base, 4 and not
an adoption of the retirement theory, which assumes that property, if
maintained, does not depreciate until it is retired.8 5 The retirement theory
never received direct sanction, though it furnishes the only possible justifi-
cation for the most singular 1923 PRT case where the Commission dis-
covered "a minimum of depreciation" offset by "a maximum of going
value." 86
After 1926 the focus of disputes over accrued depreciation shifted from
the problem of whether there should be a deduction to the question of
what was the proper method to determine the amount to be deducted.
Federal decisions, especially McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co.,8 7 had
expressed approval of the observation method, by which depreciation is
determined by examination of the physical coridition of the property. The
Public Service Commission, however, in line with the utility commissions
of other states,88 preferred to use the age-life method, by which accrued
depreciation is calculated on the basis of the age and estimated life of the
property, or a judgment figure based on consideration of the results pro-
duced by the two methods.8 9 The Superior Court also tended to favor esti-
mates based on consideration of both the age-life and observation methods.90
Despite occasional inconsistencies, the Public Service Commission per-
formed its job quite well. It benefited from the experience of earlier com-
missions in other states in many cases, and it balanced the interests of the
investor and the consumer fairly equally. It did not, however, succeed in
establishing a completely satisfactory rate base, and it did not adopt an
aggressive policy of investigating utilities whose earnings were patently
excessive, but it was hampered by the incorporation of the fair value rule
of Smyth v. Ames into the Act of 1913, and by the pro-utility attitude of
the courts of that time."' A desire to remedy the existing evils and to
protect the consumers from excessive rates masked behind reproduction
cost estimates led the Democratic legislature of 1937 to enact the present
Public Utility Law.
84. It is interesting to note that the Public Utility Commissioner used the same
method in its first attempt to establish prudent investment. PUC v. Solar Electric
Co., 18 Pa. P.U.C. 359, 390 (1938).
85. 2 WHITTEN AND WILCOX, VALUATION OF PuBuc SERVICE COaPORATIONS 1729
(1928).
86. Philadelphia v. Phila. Rapid Transit Co., 6 Pa. P.S.C. 431, 447 (1923).
87. McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., supra note 29, at 416.
88. E.g., Re Stockton Terminal, 2 Cal. R.C.R. 770, 790 (1913); Moritz v.
Edison Electric Illuminating Co., P.U.R. 1917A 364 (N.Y.); Re United Rys. &
Electric Co., P.U.R. 1926C 441 (Md.).
89. Compare Taxpayers of Easton v. Lehigh Water Co., 14 Pa. P.S.C. 1, 13
(1935) suith Chambersburg v. Chambersburg Gas Co., 11 Pa. P.S.C. 583, 595
(1932).
90. Cheltenham & Abington Sewerage Co. v. PSC, 122 Pa. Super. 252, 269-
271, 186 Atl. 149, 157-159 (1936).
91. BUCKWALTER, op. cit. supra note 46, at 316.
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FAIR VALUE UNDER THE PUBLIC UTILITY LAW
In 1937 the Public Service Commission was abolished and a new
Public Utility Commission was set up 92 to administer the Public Utility
Law.9 3 The new law was passed during the Earle Administration during
a period which many of the stimuli which produced the federal Natural
Gas Act were at work in Harrisburg.94 Examination of the legislative
history of the act indicates that it was designed to remedy the effect of
judicial legislation in favor of reproduction cost; the Chairman of the
House Committee on Public Utilities declared at the time of final passage:
". .. but I say to you that our interest is larger and broader than
the interest he has demonstrated here this evening in that we desire
to see that the people of Pennsylvania receive a fair rate from their
public service utilities, and that rate as provided by the bill will be
fair to the investors, will of necessity be fair to the employees of the
utilities, and above all will be fair to the users of the respective public
utilities. The bill provides for a return on the capital invested in the
assets of the corporation, not a fanciful one, not a conjured one, but
a real and actual value. It is on that basis that we are expecting
the Public Utilities Commission to fix the rates of the various utilities
in this State." 95
To this end, some significant changes were made in the new law. Rates
were to be "just and reasonable," 96 and the Public Utility Commission
was authorized to fix the fair value of the utility's property, but criteria
for determining fair value set forth in the earlier act were specifically
excluded.9 7 The Commission was authorized to fix temporary rates, and
to use as a rate base for this purpose original cost less accrued deprecia-
tion.98 Furthermore, this scope of judicial review, extended in 1931 to
92. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 66, §464 (Purdon, 1941). The Public Utility Com-
mission was established by the Act of March 31, 1937, whereas the Public Utility
Law was embodied in a companion act, the Act of May 28, 1937. Subsections
464 (c) and (d) preserved for the new commission all business of the Public Service
Commission.
93. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 66,,§ 1101 et seq. (Purdon, 1941).
94. See dissenting opinions of Commissioner Buchanan in PUC v. Peoples Nat-
ural Gas Co., 24 Pa. P.U.C. 669, 678-682 (1944) and 24 Pa. P.U.C. 559, 569-570
(1944). He stated that the FPC approved the act in draft form.
95. 21 PA. LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL 4522 (1937).
96. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 66, § 1141 (Purdon, 1941).
97. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 66, § 1151 (Purdon, 1941) : "The commission may after
reasonable notice and hearing, ascertain and fix the fair value of the whole or any
part of the property of any public utility, in so far as the same is material to the exer-
cise of the jurisdiction of the commission, and may make revaluations from time to
time and ascertain the fair volue of all new construction, extensions, and additions
to the property of any public utility. When any public utility furnishes more than one
of the different types of utility service enumerated in . . . this act, the commission
shall segregate the property used and useful in furnishing each type of service, and
shall not consider the property of such public utility as a unit in determining the
value of the property of such public utility for the purpose of fixing rates."
98. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 66, § 1150 (Purdon, 1941).
include independent judgment of the reasonableness of the findings 
9 9 as
a result of Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough,10 0 was cut down
to consideration of errors of law and sufficiency of the evidence.
1' 1
With the advent of the new act, coupled with the United States Su-
preme Court's recession from the McCardle doctrine, the future of repro-
duction cost as a factor in rate-making seemed short. The Commission
began a series of vigorous investigations and ordered temporary rates
in many cases.10 2 The champions of prudent investment had, however,
reckoned without the Superior Court, which seized upon the words fair
value as a means of thwarting the legislative purpose. The subsequent
history of the act has been a series of clashes over the meaning of these
ineptly drafted words. The end result has been to preserve almost intact
the valuation standards of the old Public Service Company Law, in which
reproduction cost played a very large part.
Reproduction Cost Procedure.-The theory upon which reproduction
cost valuation is predicated is that the plant as it exists has vanished
overnight and is to be rebuilt identically under present prices. The sim-
plicity with which the concept may be expressed makes the process appear
clear and definite, but in practice it proves cumbersome and highly uncer-
tain. Months and even years are spent in arriving at a figure which, for
all the pages of computations behind it is no more than a semi-expert
guess.
The procedure involved in preparing a reproduction cost estimate is
as follows: First, engineers make an inventory of all real estate, buildings,
equipment, distribultion systems, and miscellaneous property, complete to
the last detail. The number of bricks required for each building must be
estimated. Excavations must be made to determine the size, type, and
condition of water and gas mains. If the utility meters its sales, each meter
must be classified according to age, design, condition, and type of connec-
tion. After an inventory of each item has been made and divided into
classes, the engineers compute unit prices-the cost of materials and labor
to put the unit in place ready for service-for each class of item. Multiply-
ing this by the number of items in the class, they then calculate the repro-
duction cost of that part of the utility property. Reproduction costs for
land, buildings, and furniture are ascertained by consultation with real
99. Act of June 12, 1931, P.L. 530.
100. 253 U.S. 287 (1920). The rule laid down in that case is not completely
dead. See Staten Island Edison Corp. v. Maltbie, 296 N.Y. 374, 73 N.E.2d 705 (1947) ;
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Pub. Utilities Commission, 77 F. Supp. 675 (E.D.S.C.
1948). It is, however, doubtful that the United States Supreme Court would adhere to
the rule today.
101. PA. STAT. AxN., tit. 66, § 1437 (Purdon, 1941). Despite the express re-
striction in the statute, the Superior Court was not deterred from exercising its inde-
pendent judgment in Solar Electric Company v. PUC, supra note 51, at 350, 351, 9
A.2d at 464, 465, and in PTC v. PUC, 155 Pa. Super. 9, 18, 37 A.2d 138, 143 (1944).
As a rule, however, the Court prefers to reverse for error of law. See Pittsburgh v.
PUC, 158 Pa. Super. 229, 235, 44 A.2d 614, 616 (1945).
102. E.g., PUC v. Edison Light & Power Co., 17 Pa. P.U.C. 380 (1937); Phila-
delphia Electric Co., 17 Pa. P.U.C. 303 (1937).
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estate dealers, building contractors, and furniture dealers.' 03 The final
figure is the product of the judgment of many different experts, but not
even the expertness of the appraisers will produce a figure that can safely
be called accurate; it is by no means uncommon for reproduction cost esti-
mates to differ from each other by over 50 per cent.
10 4
Two of the most perplexing questions in applying reproduction cost
theory are whether the identical plant is to be reproduced and, if so,
whether the plant is to be reproduced under present conditions. Strict
adherence to theory would give an answer of yes to both these questions,
but this would be at variance with what would happen if the plant were to
be replaced; any company starting business ab initio, as the theory postu-
lates, would construct a modern plant rather than the old out-of-date one.
Yet both the federal 105 and the Pennsylvania 106 courts have stated that
reproduction cost contemplates reproduction of the actual facilities and not
comparable ones of more modern design and greater efficiency. In some
situations this produces absurd results: must the cost of obtaining a cus-
tom-made boiler be used when the type in actual use is no longer pro-
duced? Must the valuation engineer obtain the cost of wrought iron girders,
even though steel has completely replaced iron as a construction material?
In a few instances, commissions have cut through the identical plant notion
and used the cost of modern substitutes.0° 7  Similarly, they have cut
through the requirement of reproduction under present conditions. Costs
of digging up and replacing paving over mains and pipes have been dis-
allowed when such costs were not incurred in the original construction. 08
Views of the Commission 1937-1939.-An examination of the rate
cases decided during 1937 shows that reproduction cost was a major factor
in determining fair value in all but one case.10 9 The Public Utility Com-
mission's apparent adoption of reproduction cost should not, however, be
construed as indicating a reluctance to change the valuation process. A
majority of the early cases involved temporary rates and, although the act
allowed an original cost rate base for that purpose, it would seem that the
Commission felt that it was better to reduce rates immediately, although
103. See Raymond, Engineer's Methods of Inventorying and Valuing Public Util-
ity Properties, 103 University of Iowa Extension Bulletin 54-56 (April, 1924).
104. See TaAcaSE, PuBLic UTIITY REGuLATION 280 (1947).
105. McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., sapra note 29, at 417, 418.
106. Cf. Scranton-Spring Brook Water Co. v. PSC, 119 Pa. Super. 117, 181 At.
77 (1935) ; Chambersburg Gas Co. v. PSC, 116 Pa. Super. 196, 176 AtI. 794 (1935).
107. BAUEia AND GOLD, op. cit. supra note 1, at 160. In computing the reproduc-
tion cost of an elevated railway, the New York Bureau of Valuation used unit prices
for steel structures although a great deal of the metal work was of wrought iron,
which had become so obsolete that reproduction cost would have been prohibitive.
108. Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines, 238 U.S. 153, 171, 172 (1915); Cedar
Rapids Gas Light Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 144 Iowa 426, 437, 438, 120 N.W. 966, 970
(1909).
109. PUC v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 17 Pa. P.U.C. 283 (1937); PUC v. Edi-
son Light & Power Co., 17 Pa. P.U.C. 380 (1937). The book value of fixed capital
was used in Philadelphia Electric Co., 17 Pa. P.U.C. 303 (1937) as a base for tempo-
rary rates.
to a lesser degree, under a rate base that was certain to be upheld than to
attempt a drastic reduction which might not be sustained by the courts.
Emphasis is given to this interpretation by the fact that the federal court
in the Edison case a year later held the temporary rate provisions of the act
unconstitutional because of the rate base provision." The United States
Supreme Court ultimately sustained the rates in question,"' but only in
Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion was there an indication that
original cost would be a proper measure of fair value.112
The Commission took its first definite stand on reproduction cost in
the Solar case."13 Three estimates of reproduction cost were submitted.
These were based on an inventory and unit prices as of 1931, trended to
1937. The utility's estimates, by two different engineers were $286,990 and
$310,329 undepreciated, and $225,822 and $287,892 after deducting of
accrued depreciation. An engineer for the complainant presented estimates
of $224,575 as undepreciated reproduction cost, and $92,523 after deduction
for depreciation. This figure, however, did not include net additions of
$13,496 from 1931 to 1937. The Commission, noting that there was a 12
per cent difference between the utility's estimates, both of which were over
100 per cent greater than complainant's, declared that all three were "un-
satisfactory, conjectural, and without probative value." 114 It pointed out
the fallacy of assuming that the present plant would be reproduced iden-
tically and at one time, and criticized reproduction cost as a method of
valuation because of its dependence on prices which might change overnight.
In summary the Commission said "Reproduction cost new less accrued
depreciation is at variance with the prime purpose of utility regulation,
namely, to provide adequate service at just and reasonable rates, calculated
to return to the investor a fair return upon the capital he has contributed
to a public enterprize." 115 Authority for rejecting reproduction cost was
found in the trend of federal decisions.
Throughout 1938 and 1939 the Public Utility Commission refused
to give consideration to reproduction cost." 6  In the Abington Electric
Company case, the Commission referred to Justice Frankfurter's charac-
terization of the Smyth v. Ames rule as a "mischievous formula . . . use-
less as a guide for adjudication." 117 As a result, in many cases utilities did
not even bother to present reproduction cost evidence.
110. Edison Light & Power Co. v. Driscoll, 25 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
The temporary rate provisions were ultimately held constitutional because of their
recoupment feature in Beaver Valley Water Co. v. Driscoll, 28 F. Supp. 722, 728
(W.D. Pa. 1939).
111. Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co., 307 U.S. 104 (1939).
112. Id. at 122.
113. PUC v. Solar Electric Co., supra note 84.
114. Id. at 381.
115. Id. at 388-389.
116. PUC v. Yardley Water & Power Co., 19 Pa. P.U.C. 52 (1938); PUC v.
Elizabethville Water Co., 20 Pa. P.U.C. 318 (1939).
117. PUC v. Abington Electric Company, 20 Pa. P.U.C. 170, 175 (1939).
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Views of the Superior Court-1939.-The Public Utility Law had its
first real test in the Superior Court in the Solar case.
118 Perhaps because
of the stagnation of judicial thinking about fair value, or perhaps out of a
desire to emasculate what it considered undesirable legislation, the court was
unwilling to accept the Commission's interpretation of the law. After
referring to an opinion delivered before the new law took effect requiring
the Public Service Commission to ascertain the fair value of the utility,"1
9
the court declared that the failure to enumerate the items to be considered
in fixing the fair value of utility property was not intended to change the
law. The elements of value were not included "because the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court and of our Supreme Court had definitely
settled the principles to be applied by the commission in arriving at such
fair value." 120 Thus the rule of Smyth v. Ames prevailed despite the
intent of the legislature and despite the shift in the attitude of the United
States Supreme Court. The Superior Court used its independent judg-
ment and fixed fair value at $175,000, on the basis of the utility's estimates
of reproduction cost.
Views of the Commission 1940-1944.-Despite the stinging rebuke
by the Superior Court, the Commission did not alter its opinion as to the
merits of reproduction cost. In the first important rate case after the
Court's reversal, the Commission acknowledged the duty of considering
reproduction cost, but it found fair value to be $136,000. This was $6000
greater than depreciated original cost and $44,000 less than depreciated
reproduction cost.' 2' In later cases, however, the Commission was inclined
to split the difference between original cost depreciated and depreciated
reproduction cost'
22
The next attempt by the Commission to acquaint the Superior Court
with the realities of the value of reproduction cost estimates value in rate-
making caAie in the 1942 Peoples case.'23 Reproduction cost was charac-
terized as "an estimate based upon an hypothesis . . . susceptible to
neither outright proof or outright contradiction." 124 The Commission
stated that it would not determine the accurateness of the utility's figures
but would rather ascertain how closely they corresponded with common
sense and weigh them accordingly. Using a 1904 pump as an example, the
Commission pointed out that an identical counterpart is unobtainable today
and that an engineer has three possible solutions. He may use the cost
of a modern pump of equivalent capacity; this departs from the reproduc-
118. Solar Electric Co. v. PUC, supra note 51.
119. Brookville v. PSC, 102 Pa. Super. 503, 157 Atl. 513 (1931), aifirmed, 307
Pa. 194, 160 Atl. 856 (1932). That case involved an application for approval to sell
Solar's property and franchises to Pennsylvania Electric Co.
120. Solar Electric Co. v. PUC, supra note 51 at 336, 9 A.2d at 457.
121. Kooker v. Perkasie Sewer Co., 21 Pa. P.U.C. 148 (1940).
122. E.g., PUC v. St. Mary's Water Co., 21 Pa. P.U.C. 430 (1940); PUC v.
California Water Co., 21 Pa. P.U.C. 770 (1940) ; cf. PUC v. Sunbury Bridge Co., 23
Pa. P.U.C. 171 (1941).
123 PUC v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 23 Pa. P.U.C. 556 (1942).
124. Id. at 564.
tion theory. He may use the cost of a custom-made 1904 model pump; this
is ridiculous. Finally, he could trend the cost of the pump to the present
by use of price indices; but this method has been rejected by the United
States Supreme Court.125 Furthermore, installation labor today would be
of an entirely different type, raising a whole new set of problems. Faced
with these difficulties, the Commission did not attempt to reduce the utility's
figures to a sensible estimate; reproduction cost was "considered" in fixing
fair value, but it was never a factor in the final figure.
The decision to regard reproduction cost as a factor not to be weighed
heavily was continued in the PTC '2  and Manufacturers 12 7 cases. The
former case is notable because in it the Commission, despite an increase in
the amount of property since 1938, arrived at a valuation somewhat less
than the purported original cost less depreciation figure approved as the
basis for the issuance of securities in the 1938 reorganization.128 Reproduc-
tion cost, although found, was characterized as an "illusory certainty ;" again
the Commission thought reproduction of the existing plant too unlikely to
be considered.
The Reaction of the Courts.-The Commission's criticism of reproduc-
tion cost produced the Superior Court's strongest expression in favor of it.
When the Peoples case came up on appeal, Judge Kenworthey declared that
the legislative mandate of fair value meant present value.129  Original cost,
which the Commission had used as a major factor in the rate base, was
rejected as useless unless there had been no change in cost levels since the
construction of the plant or unless it was adjusted to reflect the change by
the use of price indices; otherwise it bore no relation to present value. The
fact that original cost was authorized for temporary rates was explained by
saying that this was for convenience's sake. The Court apparently over-
looked the inconsistency in saying that rates could be reduced drastically on
a temporary basis but that higher rates would have to be allowed when the
final order was issued. As it stands, the decision represents a reaffirmation
of the rule of the McCardle case at least seven years after the United States
Supreme Court had retreated from it. By saying that the meaning of fair
125. West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 295 U.S. 662 (1935). The chief
difficulty is the selection of good index numbers. See TROXELL, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 295-296. See also Scranton-Spring Brook Water Service Co. v. PSC, 119 Pa.
Super. 117, 146, 181 Atl. 77, 89 (1935). The Public Utility Commission at first indi-
cated a dislike for the method. PUC v. Manufacturers Light & Heat Co., 24 Pa.
P.U.C. 428, 440 (1943). It is now, however, looked upon as an established proce-
dure. See PUC v. Pennsylvania Telephone Co., Pennsylvania Public Utility Com-
mission, July 10, 1950; Pittsburgh v. Trustees of Pittsburgh Rys. and Pittsburgh
Motor Coach Co., Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, July 25, 1950.
126. PUC v. PTC, 24 Pa. P.U.C. 95 (1942).
127. PUC v. Manufacturers Light & Heat Co., supra note 125.
128. Application of Phila. Rapid Transit Co., 19 Pa. P.U.C. 136, 142 (1938).
Total assets were found to be $84,860,974. This represented a considerable increase
over the $55,400,000 original-historical cost figures which the commission at first ap-
proved for capitalization in 18 Pa. P.U.C. 595, 654 (1938). In the rate case, 24 Pa.
P.U.C. 95, 124 (1942), fair value was set at $77,000,000.
129. Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. PUC, 153 Pa. Super. 475, 482, 34 A.2d 375, 379
(1943).
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value was fixed permanently according to the meaning of the term in 1937
when the act was passed, 30 the majority of the Court avoided an explana-
tion of what had been happening to Sinyth v. Ames in recent years. The
definition of fair value as present value was too extreme; when the case
came before the Court again two years later, the Court was careful to point
out that the general principles of the Solar case were still in effect.131
In reviewing the valuation the Commission had placed on the Phila-
delphia Transportation Company, the Court found absolute reproduction
cost too high to be a satisfactory measure of value.13 2  Although the
majority was of the opinion that the Commission thought the PTC was
dying and would not assist in preserving indispensable service, and although
they claimed that original cost was of little importance, fair value as found
by the court was based on the 1938 reorganization figure. 33 Unfortunately,
that figure represented a considerable increase over original cost even
then,13 4 so the net result was a rate base very close to depreciated reproduc-
tion cost. In his dissent, Judge Rhodes attacked reproduction cost valuation
as an invitation to ultimate public ownership. 1 5 He declared that the
present "cost of building a replica of an obsolescent plant is not of real
significance." 1'8 Unfortunately his perception of the artificiality of repro-
duction cost has not as yet caused the Court to repudiate it as a rate base.
Views of the Commission 1944-1945.-The strong language used by
the Superior Court in the Peoples decision made a great change in the
attitude of the commission. When the Peoples case was remanded, the
Commission accepted the utility's figures on reproduction cost-although
it had previously intimated that they were suspect 187 -and set fair value
on that basis.' 38  Similarly, in the Elizabethtown 339 and Pennsylvania.
Power & Light 4" cases, reproduction cost was the dominant factor in
determining the rate base. Commissioner Buchanan, dissenting in the
latter case, characterized this as utility regulation by the utilities them-
selves and described the utility's attempt to destroy all traces of its original
costs. His position throughout this period was that the Commission should
again attempt to use actual legitimate cost depreciated relying on the Hope
130. Id. at 488-489, 34 A.2d at 382.
131. Pittsburgh v. PUC, 158 Pa. Super. 229, 236, 44 A.2d 614, 617 (1945). Judge
Kenworthey had resigned from the Court in 1944.
132. PTC v. PUC, 155 Pa. Super. 9, 23, 30, 37 A.2d 138, 145, 147 (1944).
133. Id. at 30, 37A.2d at 147.
134. See note 128 supra.
135. See BAUER, TaNSFORMING PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION (1950) for a mod-
ern view of the problem.
136. PTC v. PUC, supra note 132, at 39, 37 A.2d at 151.
137. PUC v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., supra note 123, at 566. The valuation
engineer was a shareholder in the utility's holding company.
138. PUC v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 24 Pa. P.U.C. 559, 561-562 (1944). The
Commission intimated that the close approximation of fair value to original cost de-
preciated was pure coincidence.
139. PUC v. Elizabethtown Water Co., 25 Pa. P.U.C. 22 (1944).
140. Pfeifle v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 25 Pa. P.U.C. 52 (1945).
decision's ghost-laying effects.141 However, the Commission has preferred
to stick to the Smyth v. Ames rule.
The Modern Compromise.--Although the Commission has been giving
weight to reproduction cost estimates ever, since 1944, it has not been willing
to adopt current spot prices. In the Elizabethtown case, 1941 spot prices
were used to avoid the effect of wartime price rises.1 42  In the Penn-
sylvania Power & Light case, the Commission adopted the method used
so often by the Public Service Commission; ten-year average prices were
used.1 43 Similarly, two-year average prices were used in the Bell Tele-
phone case in 1949.'4 The adoption of average prices has been approved
by the Superior Court.145  Furthermore, in recent cases, the Court has
sustained findings of fair value between reproduction cost and original
cost.146  Thus it appears that the wheel has come full circle. After some
thirty-seven years of rate regulation by commission, the net result has been
to a large extent a revival of the methods used by the Public Service
Commission when it began its work.
PRUDENT INVESTMENT
The ultimate purpose of utility regulation is to protect the consumer
from overcharges based on fictitious values. To this end the Public Utility
Law gives the Commission power to fix just and reasonable rates.14 7 How-
ever, its powers extend further; the act provides for the prescription of
uniform systems of accounts 148 and the approval by the Commission of
transfers of the utility's property 149 and securities.150 Transfers of these
sorts at value derived from reproduction cost might easily result in over-
capitalization and an inability to pay capital charges. 5 ' The utility would
141. Id. at 102, 114-115. See also his separate opinions in PUC v. Elizabethtown
Water Co., supra, note 139 at 42; PUC v. Manufacturers Light & Heat Co., supra,
note 125 at 471; PUC v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 23 Pa. P.U.C. 556, 613 (1942);
24 Pa. P.U.C. 559, 564 (1944); 24 Pa. P.U.C. 669, 673 (1944).
142. Supra note 139, at 27.
143. Supra note 140, at 62-63.
144. P.U.C. v. Bell Telephone Co., Pa. Public Utility Commission, October 17,
1949. The Commission seems to prefer five and ten-year average prices. See PUC
v. Pennsylvania Telephone Co., supra note 125.
145. Blue Mountain Tel. & Tel. Co. v. PUC, 165 Pa. Super. 320, 67 A.2d
441 (1949); Equitable Gas Co. v. PUC, 160 Pa. Super. 458, 51 A.2d 497 (1947).
146. E.g., Blue Mountain Tel. & Tel. Co. v. PUC, supra at 322, 67 A.2d at
443; Pittsburgh v. PUC, 165 Pa. Super. 519, 524, 69 A.2d 844, 847 (1949).
147. See note 96, supra.
148. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 66, § 1211-1218 (Purdon, 1941).
149. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 66, § 1122 (Purdon, 1941).
150. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 66, § 1241-1244 (Purdon, 1941).
131. If a reproduction cost appraisal is used as the basis for issuing securities,
the common shareholders are at the mercy of the price market. If prices fall, re-
sulting in a lower value for the property and, therefore, a rate reduction, or if the
demand ceases to support rates based on reproduction costs, as in Market Street
Ry. v. Railroad Commission, 324 U.S. 548, 564 (1945), the utility will be unable to
pay a return on its investment and, consequently, will not succeed in attracting neces-
sary new capital.
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then have to go through expensive reorganization proceedings or obtain
a rate increase to sustain the excessive capitalization. This would render
the prescribed original cost accounting systems meaningless. It appears
that the Public Utility Law was designed to afford the Commission an
opportunity for integrated regulation-on an original cost or prudent in-
vestment basis. 152  Adoption of prudent investment as a rate base would
preserve for the investors the integrity of their capital and assure the con-
sumers the lowest rates possible. During the first seven years of its
existence, the Commission made several attempts to adopt a form of
prudent investment, despite the hostile attitude of the Superior Court.
Undepreciated Original Cost.-The Public Utility Commission first
attempted to use a prudent investment rate base in the Solar case. The
Solar Electric Company had outstanding capital stock in the amount of
$75,000, of which. $65,000 represented stock dividends over prior years.
The original cost of fixed capital, according to the books, was $197,516.
However, included in fixed capital was an item of $60,048 representing
a generating plant which was no longer in use since the company bought
its power from Pennsylvania Electric Company. The Commission deter-
mined that the fixed capital account should be reduced by $55,548 since
the building was used only for storage and was no longer used or useful
as a standby plant. Following the theory approved by the Supreme Court
in the recent Pacific Gas case, 153 the Commission adopted original cost un-
depreciated less the cost of the property considered non-useful. Annual
depreciation was allowed on a four per cent sinking-fund basis'" The
Commission declared that it was its desire "that a fair return be allowed
the investor upon the dollars which have been furnished and used in the
utility business," 155 allowing an amount for yearly depreciation which,
when invested in additions to the plant or securities of another concern,
would produce an amount sufficient to return the investment. The argu-
ment against deducting accrued depreciation was that depreciation of
property cannot be said to lessen the dollars of investment in that prop-
erty. 1 6  The same method was used in other rate cases decided at the
152. See dissenting opinion of Commissioner Buchanan in PUC v. Peoples Na-
tural Gas Co., 24 Pa. P.U.C. 669, 679 et seq.; dissenting opinion of Commissioner
Beamish in PUC v. PTC, supra note 126, at 152-154 (1942).
153. Railroad Commission v. Pacific Gas and Electric. Co., 302 U.S. 388, 397-398
(1938).
15[. PUC v. Solar Electric Co., supra note 84, at 390-391 (1938). No deduction
for depreciation was made because the sinking-fund method was used. Under this
method a smaller allowance for depreciation is made, but that sum remains in the
rate base and earns a return. The allowed depreciation plus the return on it will
theoretically return the whole investment by the time the property wears out. See
also 2 BON RIGHT, op. cit. supra note 11, at 1133-1134. The Commission found
accrued depreciation of $78,422 which, when deducted from the rate base of $152,601,
would give approximately the amount of invested capital.
155. PUC v. Solar Electric Co., stupra note 84, at 389.
156. Compare Bauer, The Establishment and Administration of a "Prudent In-
vestment" Rate Base, 53 YAIr L.J. 495 (1944) with Ferguson, "Cost" as a Substi-
tute for "Value" in Utility Rate Base Determination: A comment on Dr. Baier's
Position, 53 YAr.E L.J. 721 (1944). See also 2 BoNBmiGHT, op. cit. supra note 11,
at 1137-1140.
same time,157 except in the case of taxicab businesses. For these, a rate
base derived from original cost less accrued depreciation was used on the
ground that the fixed capital was too short-lived to justify the use of the
sinking-fund depreciation method.'6 8
When the Superior Court made its valuation in the Solar case, prudent
investment was not even considered. The Court referred contemptuously
to the Commission's "alleged justifications for its determination to ignore
established legal principles" and the economic theories it "may have evolved
to its own entire satisfaction," 119 and fixed fair value on the basis of
depreciated reproduction cost. Furthermore, the generating plant was
included in the rate base at one-half its reproduction cost, on the basis of
testimony by the utility's engineer that it was required as a stand-by plant.
Origin ul Cost Depreciated.-After its defeat in the Solar case, the
Commission ceased to use undepreciated original cost as a measure of
value. However, original cost less accrued depreciation was constantly
used to offset the excesses of reproduction cost.160  Furthermore, the
Commission, in its application of the Smyth v. Ames rule, refused to allow
the inclusion of property which it considered no longer useful in its find-
ing of fair value. The cost of traction facilities which were no longer
used was excluded in the valuation of a toll bridge, and both original cost
and reproduction cost were further reduced by the deduction of a per-
centage of the cost of one of the steel girders which had been strength-
ened to bear the additional weight of the trolleys.161
As the Commission again turned away from reproduction cost, it
began to use depreciated original cost as a rate base, although it attempted
to camouflage its decision by paying lip service to Smyth v. Ames. For
example, in the Peoples case it solemly declared that all factors must be
considered since "the factors and processes which result in fairness in one
case may result in gross unfairness to utility or consumer in another" and
listed seven elements of fair value.162 In summing up the valuations, the
Commission found depreciated reproduction cost to be $39,730,207 and
original cost less accrued depreciation to be $22,095,839. The Commission
stated that, after considering each element specifically mentioned, it was
of the opinion that the fair value as a going concern was $20,000,000.
Similarly, in the Manufacturers case, the Commission went through the
same elaborate mumbo-jumbo and found the reproduction cost depreciated
to be $47,602,627, original cost depreciated $24,058,545 and the rate base
as a going concern, $24,000,000.11
Book Cost Less Book Reserve.-One would normally expect depre-
ciated original cost and book cost less book reserve to be the same. How-
157. See cases cited notes 116 and 117 supra.
158. E.g., PUC T. Laurel Line Taxicab Co., 19 Pa. P.U.C. 374 (1938).
159. Solar Elec. Co. v. PUC, spra note 51, at 337, 350, 9 A.2d at 457, 463.
160. See cases cited notes 121 and 122 upra.
161. PUC v. Sunbury Bridge Co., 23 Pa. P.U.C. 171, 177-178 (1941).
162. PUC v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., supra note 123, at 563.
163. PUC v. Manufacturers Light & Heat Co., supra note 125, at 455-457.
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ever, except in the PTC case,164 which will be discussed later, the Com-
mission's findings of book cost less book reserve more accurately reflected
the amount invested in utility property than the figure given as depreciated
original cost. This is explained partly by the fact that the book reserve
represented the actual dollars of investment recovered in prior years, 6 5 and
partly by the fact that in determining book cost the Commission carefully
eliminated all the fictitious and inflated values that had crept into the util-
ity's original cost estimate. For example, in the Peoples case, the Com-
mission uncovered a transaction by which the utility had created an ap-
praisal surplus by writing up fixed capital by $3,893,222 and then paid
dividends out of the surplus thus created.166 Later the utility wished to
eliminate the write-up, but in order to do so it was forced to debit the
depreciation reserve to the extent that the appraisal surplus was insufficient.
Thus the write-up was preserved in the depreciated original cost figure.
The Commission adjusted this and other items in determining a net book
cost of $9,869,793 as opposed to the $22,085,839 given for depreciated
original cost.167  In the Manufacturers case, the Commission eliminated a
1914 reproduction cost write-up and obtained a net book cost of
$17,718,809.16s However, although the calculations were made, the ma-
jority of the Commission made little use of the figure; at best it was a
qualitative factor in causing them to fix fair value slightly below depre-
ciated original cost.
Commissioner Buchanan dissented in both the Peoples and Manu-
facturers cases.169 He rested his findings of fair value on book value and
invested capital. In regard to book value, his position was that the book
depreciation reserve represented actual dollars recovered out of gross
revenue and should, therefore, be deducted in determining depreciated
original cost; failure to do this would give the utility a return on the rate-
payers' money. Applying the adjusted depreciation reserve to the original
cost of the plant in the Manufacturers case, he obtained a figure of
164. PUC v. PTC, 24 Pa. P.U.C. 95 (1942).
165. See infra p. 400.
166. The bookkeeping entries were as follows:
Writing up fixed capital $3,893,222
Creating appraisal surplus $3,893,222
Subsequent dividends created a $118,799 deficit in earned surplus and reduced
the appraisal surplus by $1,500,000. The company then decided to "clear
up" its balance sheet and made the following entries:
Reducing the appraisal surplus to zero from $2,393,322
Reducing the depreciation reserves by $2,390,994.
Writing off the excess appraisal of fixed capital of $3,893,222
Changing the deficit in earned surplus to a $722,194 credit figure by
a credit of $890,994.
167. PUC v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., supra note 123, at 577-580. The effect
of the company's entries was to distort the amount of capital amortized by previous
charges to the reserve. Although the asset accounts were reduced to original cost,
net book value remained substantially the same as before.
168. PUC v. Manufacturers Light & Heat Co., .tpra note 125, at 445-446.
169. PUC v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., .-upra note 123, at 613-617; PUC v.
Manufacturers Light & Heat Co., mipra note 125, at 471-481.
$12,405,347 for depreciated original cost-approximately one-half the figure
found by the majority and used by them as fair value. He admitted that
the result appeared drastic, but he felt that this represented all of the
original investment in fixed capital that had not been recovered out of in-
come.170 From a prudent investment point of view, his analysis is quite
sound. Book cost, as he would see it, represents the dollars of capital
originally invested or reinvested in utility property, while book reserve
represents the dollars of that investment that have been recovered out of
earnings. The rate base is the number of dollars the owners have put
into the business, and not in any sense the value of the assets into which
the dollars have been transformed. This method more accurately reflects
the capital still prudently invested than the method used in the Solar case,
although it may seem to penalize the utility for its prior accounting prac-
tices.1 71
Invested Capital.-A third "element of value" used by the Commission
in the Peoples and Manufacturers cases was invested capital. However,
this was, like net book cost, used more as a qualitative than a quantitative
factor. In the Peoples case, invested capital was defined as the number
of dollars invested in the business either directly or by allowing surplus to
accumulate. The Commission declared that "although we will not consider
invested capital as being a direct factor in fair value determination, it does
perform a very important function by showing us at what point a fair
value finding would work a hardship upon respondent's owners." 172
Invested capital was found to be $12,744,126, and bore little actual relation
to the final fair value figure. In the Manufacturers case, the invested capi-
tal was $15,343,125, lower than any other figure found by the majority
of the Commission.'7" Commissioner Buchanan, however, placed consider-
able importance on invested capital in relation to the other elements of value.
In the Peoples case, he declared that the difference between the $20,000,000
found as fair value and the net invested capital indicated to him that the
utility was earning a return on $7,000,000 of the ratepayers' money.
174
To assure the consumers the cheapest possible service and at the same
time preserve the integrity of the investment, rate regulation should be
integrated with all other phases of utility regulation, such as control over
the issuance of securities. The goal should be to keep the amount of in-
vested capital approximately equal to a rate base determined by prudent
investment methods. Divergence would indicate either inflated values in
the rate base or overcapitalization which would itself lead to attempts to
swell the rate base.
170. PUC v. Manufacturers Light & Heat Co., .spra note 125, at 476.
171. See 2 BONBRIGHT, op. cit. mipra note 11, at 1133-1140. To some extent
the method used in the Solar case involves a double return. The investor gets a
return on a greater part of his investment while an amount equal to the investment
is being built up to reinvest.
172. PUC v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., stpra note 123, at 591.
173. PUC v. Manufacturers Light & Heat Co., supra note 125, at 446.
174. PUC v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., supra note 123, at 616.
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The Special Problem of the PTC.-A striking example of the effects
of utility regulation that is not integrated is the PTC case in 1942.175 The
history of this proceeding dates back to 1938 when the Philadelphia Rapid
Transit Company was reorganized and became the PTC. When the Com-
mission first considered the reorganization plan, it found original historical
cost less accrued depreciation to be $55,400,000, and refused to approve the
plan.1 76 However, upon reconsidering the matter, the Commission allowed
a valuation of $84,860,974 in order to arrive at a speedy solution of the
problem.177 When the rate case came up in 1942, the Commission dis-
covered the dangers of not adopting a prudent investment system of regu-
lation. Although two of the commissioners wished to use original cost de-
preciated as a rate base, the majority compromised on a depreciated book
cost, derived from the Commission's $84,860,974 figure, less certain items
the Commission felt were not properly included in fixed capital. The final
rate base was $77,000,000. Commissioner Beamish, in his concurring opin-
ion, vigorously condemned fair value as found. He declared that the pro-
ceeding was "a legalistic subterfuge devised for the purpose of validating
fraudulently issued securities for which no cash has ever been paid ...
In this case, instead of a rdte base that should be solid as a rock, we are
attempting to make a rate base of a huge mud pie." 178 Unfortunately,
the Superior Court accepted fair value as ultimately found in the reorgani-
zation case as res judicata for the purposes of rate regulation and fixed
fair value at $93,000,000.179
Prudent Investment Today.--Judge Kenworthey very carefully drew
the line between fair value and prudent investment in the Peoples case.
Invested capital was rejected as no evidence of value, as was net book
value, which he characterized as "nothing more than a bookkeeping fig-
ure." 180 Since that time, the Commission has not considered either figure
in any way despite Commissioner Buchanan's efforts to have the issue
resubmitted to the Court in the light of the Hope decision.181 The Com-
mission today is definitely committed to fair value,182 although it con-
tinues to consider depreciated original cost as evidence of value. To the
extent that it curbs the excesses of reproduction cost, original cost per-
forms a vital function, but it is a poor substitute for prudent investment
rigidly adhered to.
175. See note 126 supra.
176. Application of Phila. Rapid Transit Co., 18 Pa. P.U.C. 595 (1938).
177. Application of Phila. Rapid Transit Co., 19 Pa. P.U.C. 136, 139, 142
(1938). The commission later placed itself on record as not being committed to
adopt the reorganization figure in later proceedings. PUC v. Phila. Rapid Transit
Co., 20 Pa. P.U.C. 699, 702 (1939).
178. PUC v. PTC, supra note 126 at 152-153.
179. PTC v. PUC, supra note 132, at 30, 37 A.2d at 147.
180. Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. PUC, supra note 129, at 485, 34 A.2d at 381.
181. PUC v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 24 Pa. P.U.C. 559, 570-574 (1944).
182. PUC v. Equitable Gas Co., 25 Pa. P.U.C. 302 (1945); PUC v. Bell
Tel. Co., supra note 144. Fair value, however, does not mean merely reproduction
cost.
SPECIAL VALUATION PROBLEMS
No matter what theory the rate base is predicated on, there are cer-
tain items of property included in the rate base which require special treat-
ment. Land, for example, has always presented a difficult problem, al-
though it received much more detailed treatment from the Public Service
Commission than it has from the Public Utility Commission. This lack of
detailed treatment may be laid to the fact that the present commission has
been much more concerned with the controversy between fair value and
prudent investment than with the particular application of either theory
in detail.'8s
In dealing with land, the Public Service Commission did not adhere
to any one method.18 4  Favorable location of the property was made the
basis for an increased valuation in the Ben Avon case. 8 5 This was upheld
by the Superior Court, 8 6 and the Commission used the same method in
the Scranton-Spring case.'18 However, in fixing fair value of a bridge
company, it refused to capitalize the bridge's location.' s s In line with its
predilection for reproduction cost, the Commission generally used market
value of land in preference to actual cost,'8 9 but it varied on the question
of whether other uses for land in the same vicinity should be considered.'90
The Superior Court was generally of the opinion that these alternative
uses were relevant.191 Wasting assets such as gas lands were included
in the rate base at present value, even though the actual cost of acquisi-
tion might have been very slight.
19 2
The Commission and the courts split on the inclusion of seldom
needed plant capacity in the rate base. The Commission was inclined to
consider facilites kept for standby or emergency purposes as property no
longer used or useful for the public convenience, and refused to consider
their value in determining the proper rate base. 9 3 In general the courts
were more in favor of liberal allowances, basing inclusion at full reproduc-
tion cost on the utility's exercise of judgment regarding future needs and
emergencies.' 94
183. The question has more often been whether the property was used or useful
in the public service.
184. BUCKWALTER, op. cit. supra note 46, at 181-192.
185. Ben Avon Borough v. Ohio Valley Water Co., supra note 68, at 986.
186. Ben Avon Borough v. Ohio Valley Water Co., stpra note 56, at 582-583.
187. Scranton v. Scranton-Spring Brook Water Service Co., mpra note 65, at 31.
188. Herring v. Clark's Ferry Bridge Co., 8 Pa. P.S.C. 61, 69 (1926),
affirmed sub noma. Clark's Ferry Bridge Co. v. PSC, 108 Pa. Super. 49, 72-74
165 AtI. 261, 269 (1933). This view was ultimately sustained by the United States
Supreme Court in 291 U.S. 227, 237, 238 (1934).
189. Lehighton Chamber of Commerce v. Lehighton Water Supply Co., 10 Pa.
P.S.C. 142, 146 (1929).
190. Compare Scranton v. Scranton-Spring Brook Water Service Co., mspra
note 65, at 30 with Grubb v. Berry Springs Water Supply Co., 9 Pa. P.S.C. 698,
700 (1929).
191. Lehighton Water Supply Co. v. PSC, 99 Pa. Super 574 (1930).
192. Grove City v. Union Heat & Light Co., 11 Pa. P.S.C. 792 (1933).
193. Thayer v. Beaver Valley Water Co., 2 Pa. P.S.C. 430, 443, 444 (1917);
see Brubaker v. Millersburg Home Water Co., 8 Pa. P.S.C. 193, 196 (1926).
194. Beaver Valley Water Co. v. PSC, 76 Pa. Super. 255, 261, 262 (1921).
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Expensed Iterns.-In a number of cases the Public Utility Commis-
sion has been faced with a problem apparently not dealt with by its prede-
cessor-the problem of attempts to capitalize items of propery and labor
which had already been charged to operating expenses. For example,
original cost as found in the Peoples case included some $7,558,226 of
property and overheads which had been charged to expense in the past.
The Commission, reasoning that the cost of these items had already been
recovered from the consumer, deducted this sum in arriving at original
cost for rate purposes. 195 The Superior Court at first declared that these
items were includable as a part of fair value,'19 6 but in a subsequent appeal
it changed its mind. 97 Since then, the Commission has consistently elimi-
nated expensed items.'98
Intangible Itens.-A number of items are included in the rate base
that are not represented by any physical assets. These items, with the
exception of the ambiguous concept of going concern value, are properly
capitalizable as essential costs in the setting up of the utility's business
just as the costs of tangible items-land, distribution facilities, and the
plant itself-are properly capitalized. 9 9  Nevertheless, the utmost care
must be exercised, particularly in reproduction cost estimates, in the valua-
tion of intangible items since, by their nature, they afford immense possi-
bilities for swelling the rate base by figures based purely on the utility's
imagination.20 0  Intangible items fall into three main categories-overheads
during construction, cost of financing, and going concern value--each of
which has a separate valuation treatment.
Overheads.-Overheads during construction include allowances for
omissions and contingencies, for engineering, for organization, promotion,
and administration expense, and for interest expense during the period of
construction. These are computed as percentages of the sum of the physi-
cal property (less land) and the overheads already computed.2 01 As a
result, an error in the allowance for omissions and contingencies will be
included in the allowances for all other construction overheads. Despite
the dangers involved, the Public Service Commission was generally mod-
erate in its allowances for overheads; the average total was from twelve
to fifteen per cent of total reproduction cost.202
195. PUC v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., supra note 123, at 584-585 (1942).
196. Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. PUC, upra note 129, at 492-493, 34 A.2d
at 384. See dissenting opinion of Judge Rhodes at 512-513, 34 A.2d at 395.
197. Pittsburgh v. PUC, 158 Pa. Super. 229, 236-238, 44 A.2d 614, 617
(1945).
198. PUC v. North Penn Gas Co., 25 Pa. P.U.C. 319, 322-323 (1945).
199. See MONTGOmERY, AuDrrlNG 225, 229 (7th ed. 1949).
200. See TRoxmI, op. cit. supra note 1, at 309. See also Hale, op. cit. supra note
11, at 1123.
201. The procedure for computation is set forth at length in Chambersburg v.
Chambersburg Gas Co., 11 Pa. P.S.C. 583, 585-603 (1932) and in BUCKWALTER, op.
cit. supra note 46, at 228.
202. BUJCKWALTER, op. cit. supra note 46, at 225-229. BAUER AND GOLD, op. cit.
upra note 1, at 183, state that sixteen per cent is a reasonable allowance.
The Superior Court in the Solar case set forth at length the justifica-
tion for the inclusion of intangibles in the rate base under the Public Utility
Law. Since the Commission had not made any findings as to what allow-
ances were proper in the reproduction cost estimate, the court undertook
to make independent findings for the various intangibles and allowed 172
per cent of the depreciated reproduction cost of the physical property for
overheads and cost of financing.20 3 The Commission has not attempted
to dispute the propriety of including overheads and, as a rule, it has found
the utility's figures reasonable. 20 4  However, in the Manufacturers case
the Commission criticized the allowance of an item of expense for engi-
neers competent to design the most efficient and appropriate system "solely
for the prosaic purpose of reproducing the existing system." 205 The Com-
mission admitted that the inconsistencies were largely due to the hypo-
thetical nature of reproduction cost and made no specific adjustments of
overheads. Even today, although in most instances the utility's figures are
accepted, the Commission retains a somewhat skeptical attitude towards the
utilities' more unusual claims; in the recent Bell Telephone case engineer-
ing overheads for the smaller buildings were disallowed since it appeared
that the utility did not make a practice of using engineers for such minor
construction.206
Since accounting theory permits the capitalization of overheads during
construction as a necessary part of making the property ready for service,
it would, therefore, seem that those overhead expenses which have actually
been incurred are a part of original cost for rate-making purposes. How-
ever, mere proof that the expenses were incurred is not enough. The
utility should be required to prove that the services were performed and
that they were actually paid for-requirements for which the Commission
recognized the need in the Solar case, but which it did not then enforce.
207
In addition, the utility should be required to show that the overhead costs
have not been recovered out of earnings, for it is a common practice to
write these costs off against income in later years.2°8 The Commission
pointed out the inconsistency of allowing a return on recovered overhead
expense in the Manufacturers case, where it treated amortized overheads
in the same manner as it had treated expensed items of tangible property.2° 9
Cost of Financing.-The inclusion in the rate base of cost of financing
is predicated upon the fact that some of the dollars invested must be used
to assemble capital with which to do business. To the extent that cost of
203. Solar Elec. Co. v. PUC, supra note 51, at 355-364, 9 A.2d at 465-469.
204. PUC v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., supra note 123, at 566, 567.
205. PUC v. Manufacturers Light & Heat Co., supra note 125, at 435-437.
206. See note 144, supra.
207. PUC v. Solar Electric Co., supra note 84, at 374.
208. See A.I.A. Accounting Research Bulletin No. 24, pp. 199-200 (Dec. 1944).
209. See PUG v. Manufacturers Light and Heat Co., supra note 125, at 452-453.
See, with regard to the requirements of proof for allowances for intangibles, Burt and
Highsaw, Developmental Costs Under the Prudent Investitent Theory, 94 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 1, 13-17 (1945).
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financing represents the cost of obtaining money-underwriting, printing,
and solicitation expense-it represents a capitalizable item, but discount
on securities, being essentially an adjustment of the interest rate, is gen-
erally excluded in cost of financing, allowances.
Cost of financing had a stormy history under the Public Service Com-
pany Act. At first, the Commission decided to exclude it entirely,210 but
the Superior Court directed that both brokerage and discount be in-
cluded. 211  Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania adopted the
views outlined in the preceding paragraph2 12  Thereafter, the controversy
was mainly over whether the allowance should be based on the costs the
utility actually incurred or on the costs the utility might incur in repro-
ducing the capital structure at the time of the valuation. The Commission
was inclined to favor the former view,21 3 but the Superior Court declared
that an allowance should be made, whether or not any expense had been
incurred originally.
2 14
When the Public Utility Commission first considered cost of financing,
the item was completely excluded as not being connected with the rate
base of the property. The Commission declared that if the cost of obtain-
ing money was a vital factor it should be considered in fixing the rate of
return.215  The Superior Court, however, followed its earlier decisions
under the Public Service Company Law and included brokerage and the
costs of printing, registration, and distribution in the rate base. However,
the Court limited the allowance to the cost of marketing bonds; it held
that a utility was not entitled to capitalize the cost of marketing its common
stock.2 16  While the majority of jurisdictions take the position adopted
by the Commission in the Solar case,2 17 it would seem that brokerage and
the various other costs are a necessary element in the cost of furnishing
utility service and should be included in the rate base, whether they stem
from the marketing of bonds or stock.218 Nevertheless, Superior Court's
ruling has crystallized the law on this point in Pennsylvania. In deter-
mining reproduction cost, the Commission has since made allowances for
costs of financing the new plant based on the amount that might be
210. Thayer v. Beaver Valley Water Co., supra note 76, at 457-458 (1916);
See Ben Avon Borough v. Ohio Valley Water Co., m.pra note 68, at 976.
211. Ben Avon Borough v. Ohio Valley Water Co., mspra note 56, at 591-593
(1917).
212. Ben Avon Borough v. Ohio Valley Water Co., 271 Pa. 346, 356-357, 114
Atl. 369, 373 (1921), reversing the stand taken in 260 Pa. 289, 308, 103 Atl. 744,
749 (1918), where the court declared that brokerage should be considered in the
rate of return.
213. Enck v. Biglersville Water Co., 7 Pa. P.S.C. 158 (1925).
214. Erie v. PSC, 96 Pa. Super. 42, 51-52 (1929).
215. PUC v. Solar Elec. Co., note 84, at 383-385 (1938).
216. Solar Elec. Co. v. PUC, supra note 51 at 358-361, 9 A. 2d at 466-468.
217. Re Rochester Gas & Electric Corp., 33 P.U.R. (N.S.) 393, 452-453 (N.Y.
1940); Pub. Serv. Commission v. Utah Light & Power Co., 50 P.U.R. (N.S.) 133,
153 (Utah 1943); Re Alabama Power Co., 43 P.U.R. (N.S.) 37, 47 (FPC 1941).
218. Cf. Re British Columbia Electric RR., 53 P.U.R. (N.S.) 438, 455 (1943).
financed by the sale of bonds. 219 In the Pennsylvania Power and Light
case, the commission reasoned that preferred stock was more in the nature
of a bond than a stock and made an allowance for cost of financing by the
sale of preferred stock.
220
Going Value.-Going value or going concern value is one of the most
persistent problems in valuation proceedings. It is said not to be good-
will, for good-will is a capitalization of prospective earnings built up
through competition and, therefore, is too closely allied with market value
to be acceptable. Going value, at least in theory, is the value, over and
above the "bare bones" of the plant, that the utility has acquired as a
going concern 2 21 No sensible measurement of going value has ever been
devised, and utilities have seized upon it as an easy way to inflate the rate
base. .2  The Public Service Commission never specifically defined going
value, but the decisions of the Superior Court have generally equated it to
the cost of developing a profitable business. 223 In early cases the Public
Service Commission made no separate allowance for going value.2 4 The
Superior Court stated several times that it wanted a specific allowance,
but the Commission did not comply until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
spoke in the Erie case.2 25 However, the Superior Court began to reject
allowances for going value unless there was evidence of a lag in earnings
besides the records of the utility, but continued to allow it when there
was evidence to support the utility's claim.
226
The Superior Court in the Solar case stated that going value might
exist in two forms.2 27 The first of these was an efficient force of employees
developed over the years. No evidence of any such special value ap-
peared. The second form that going value might take was a lag in fair
return before the public began to take advantage of the source. Again
no evidence was found to sustain a special allowance. Since that decision
the Public Utility Commission has never itself felt called upon to make
an allowance for going value, and on this point it has never been reversed
by the court. The reason for this is apparent from the fact that utility
service, being innately necessary and monopolistic, should be successful
from the start. Furthermore, in a prudent investment rate base, going
value has no place; the fact that a return is earned is of itself a sufficient
219. PUC v. Elizabethtown Water Co., supra note 139, at 28-29.
220. Pfeifle v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., .upra, note 140, at 59-60. Com-
missioner Buchanan dissented.
221. The distinction between this and good-will is hard to perceive. Any value
over and above the "bare bones" of the plant is essentially a potential income value,
which is nothing but good-will.
222. See TnOXELI, op. cit. supra note 1, at 319-321.
223. Beaver Valley Water Co. v. PSC, mtpra note 194, at 269-270 (1921).
224. See note 52 supra.
225. Erie v. PSC, 278 Pa. 512, 534, 123 Atl. 471, 479 (1924). The first case
in which the commission made a separate allowance was York v. York Water Co.,
6 Pa. P.S.C. 666, 679-680 (1924).
226. Scranton-Spring Brook Water Service Co. v. PSC, 105 Pa. Super. 203,
220-221, 160 Atl. 230, 237 (1932) ; Cheltenham & Abington Sewerage Co. v. PSC,
122 Pa. Super. 252, 267, 186 Atl. 149, 156-157 (1936).
227. Solar Elec. Co. v. PUC, supra note 51, at 361-364, 9 A.2d at 468-469.
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allowance for going concern value, and past losses have been recovered
long ago.228
Working Capital.-In every rate case some allowance must be made
for cash working capital and materials and supplies. Fortnightly payrolls
must be met, and replacements of minor parts occur frequently. Therefore,
the utility must always keep a supply of money and materials on hand.
Since part of the investor's capital must be tied up in working capital, that
amount must be included in the rate base. The practice of the Public
Utility Commission has been to allow sufficient working capital to take
care of the utility's needs for current operating expenses for from one and
one-half to three months.22D
DEPREcIATIoN-Loss IN VALUE OR AMORTIZATION OF COST?
The determination of the proper allowance for accrued depreciation
has been one of the most perplexing aspects of rate regulation.230 Part
of the difficulty stems from uncertainty over which method should be used
to calculate the allowance; the divergence of opinion has already been
indicated to some extent in the section on the Public Service Commission.
231
There is, however, a more basic difficulty which is not always perceived:
there are two different theories as to the function depreciation is intended
to serve. Fair value rate regulation adopts one of these theories and
prudent investment rate regulation the other. Under the former theory,
accrued depreciation connotes the extent of the property's loss in value
from wear and tear. It is an estimate just as fair value is an estimate. On
the other hand, accounting theory conceives of the function of depreciation
as the amortization or spreading out of the cost of the property over its
life.2 32 Accrued depreciation under this theory represents the amount of
the cost of (or investment in) the property already recovered and is evi-
denced by the actual charges against income in past years; no problem
of estimating depreciation by consideration of results obtained by various
methods arises.2 n Thus, if prudent investment is adhered to, the problems
surrounding depreciation virtually disappear. Unfortunately, the Public
Utility Commission has, as a rule, regarded depreciation as loss in value.
In the Peoples case, for example, it stated that it was attempting to de-
termine how far the property had moved along the road from newness to
junk.
2s '
228. See TRoXELL, op. cit. s=pra note 1, at 326-327.
229. PUC v. St. Mary's Water Co., 21 Pa. P.U.C. 430, 438-439 (1940); PUC
v. Equitable Gas Co., 25 Pa. P.U.C. 302, 309 (1945).
230. See TROXELL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 328-371; 1 BONBRIGHT, Op. Cit. supra
note 11, at 177-215.
231. See text supra pp. 380-381.
232. A.I.A. Accounting Research Bulletin No. 22, pp. 179-180 (May 1944);
A.I.A. Accounting Research Bulletin No. 20 (Nov. 1943).
233. See generally Lippitt, Net Investment Rate Making-The Deduction for
Depreciation, 62 -ARv. L. Rav. 1155 (1949).
234. PUC v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., supra note 123, at 569.
Methods of Ascertaining Loss in Value.-The classic method of esti-
mating loss in value, and the one continually advocated by the utilities,
is the observation method. This method is essentially a part of the re-
production cost process, since the engineer at the time at which he in-
ventories the property also appraises its condition. Thus reproduction cost
less the observed depreciation should give the present value of the prop-
erty. However, the method is seriously defective since it takes into ac-
count only visible physical deterioration and makes no provision for obso-
lescence or inadequacy. 235 Furthermore, its accuracy is largely dependent
on the extent of the inspection. In the Peoples case, the Commission
called attention to its limitations. 36 The utility engineer made 1479 ob-
servations of the pipe lines. Thus of a total of 21,649,000 feet of pipe,
about 5800 were examined. Furthermore, the Commission found a fur-
ther fallacy in the method of estimating the per cent condition of the
property. For meters, which had an average age of 23Y2 years, which
was about half their useful life, the utility engineer estimated loss in value
at sixteen per cent. This would result in an estimated life of 141 years.
The Commission stated that it was illogical to assume that each year was
not an equal contributor toward final retirement, at least in potential
depreciation.
Two methods of computing accrued depreciation attempt to take into
account potential depreciation and spread the loss in value equally over
the life-of the property. By far the simplest and certainly the most com-
monly used is the straight-line method which involves estimating the total.
useful life of the property, taking into account such factors as probable
obsolescence and inadequacy, and calculating how much the property has
lost in value by the formula: age over estimated life times the value of the
property new gives accrued depreciation to date.m7 Despite the apparent
definiteness produced by the formula, the results reached are only a guess.
For example, a certain machine may cost $100,000 and have an expected
life of ten years. Under the straight-line method, accrued depreciation
after five years will be $50,000, but in the meantime a new process may
have been invented or the machine may have been heavily used 2 s38 with
the result that the present machine is now worth only $20,000. On the
other hand, the original estimate of the machine's life may have been too
low; the machine may be good for ten years more.
The sinking-fund method is similar to the straight-line method in
that it is based on estimated lives of the property and in that it makes use
of equal annual charges against earnings. However, the annual charges
against earnings are smaller under the sinking-fund method, since the
235. 1 BONBRIGHT, op. Cit. spra note 11, at 204-205.
236. PUC v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., supra note 123, at 569-572.
237. This formula is generally used in calculating the annual charges against
income under the accounting theory. See MoNxomERY, op. cit. supra note 199, at
268.
238. Neither the straight line nor the sinking-fund versions of the age-life com-
putation take into account extent of use, except insofar as the estimated age is
periodically recomputed.
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theory behind the method assumes that the amounts set aside each year
will be invested at compound interest, usually from three to four per cent.
The sum of the annual depreciation charges plus the accumulated interest
will add up to the cost of the asset by the time it is worn out. If the sink-
ing-fund method is to be used in rate-making, the rate base should be
undepreciated cost.23 9 This has been perceived by the Railroad Commis-
sion of California,240 which uses this method almost exclusively, and by
the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission in the Solar case.2 41 How-
ever, attempts have been made to use the sinking-fund method as a measure
of loss in value, and in these cases accrued depreciation has been deducted
from the rate base.242 This is a function the sinking-fund method was
never intended to serve.
In those cases where depreciation is treated as loss in value, the
Public Utility Commission has never finally committed itself to any par-
ticular method; it adopts in each case a judgment figure based upon what
it feels to be competent evidence. 243 For example, in the Perkasie case
chief reliance was placed upon the sinking-fund method since the utility's
observed depreciation estimate was simply an estimate of the expense
necessary to keep the facilities in working condition. 24 4 On the other hand,
the Commission used both computations on the straight-line method and
observation data in the Peoples case, declaring that use of either method
without the other would be ridiculous.24 5  In the Pennsylvania Power &
Light case a flat fifteen per cent estimate was used in preference to the
utility's mortality table computation and the Commission engineer's ob-
servation and obsolescence estimates.24 6  In general, the Commission pre-
fers the straight-line method because of its comprehensiveness and equal-
izing tendencies.
That the Superior Court regarded depreciation as loss in value was
evident from the Peoples case. Judge Kenworthey stated that there are
only two factors that are relevant-physical deterioration and obsolescence.
He went on to criticize the Commission's reliance on the age-life method
and said "it seems that there can never be an adequate substitute for actual
observation of the condition of the property coupled with a study of its
state of obsolescence." 247 The Court's belief in observed depreciation was
emphasized in the PTC case.248  Logically, the position is irrefutable, pro-
239. 2 BONBRIGHT, op. cit. mtpra note 11, at 1134.
240. E.g., San Diego v. San Diego Consolidated Gas & Electric Co., 7 P.U.R.
(N.S.) 443, 466-467 (Cal. 1935).
241. PUC v. Solar Electric Co., supra note 84, at 389.
242. E.g., Idaho Power Co. v. Thompson, 19 F.2d 547, 565 (D. Idaho 1927);
PSC v. Cheltenham & Abington Sewerage Co., 14 Pa. P.S.C. 76, 86 (1935).
243. PUC v. Bell Tel. Co., supra note 144.
244. Kooker v. Perkasie Sewer Co., supra note 121 at 152-153.
245. PUC v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., suzpra note 123, at 570-576.
246. Pfeifle v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., upora note 140 at 69-80. The
commission enghieer's study was too limited for the Commission to rely on it abso-
lutely.
247. Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. PUC, mspra note 129, at 491, 34 A.2d at 383.
248. PTC c. PUC, supra note 132, at 25-27, 37 A.2d at 145-146.
vided that depreciation represents loss in value, and provided that the
inspection is thorough enough. The Commission, being more aware of
administrative problems, seems to take a more liberal attitude towards
the merits of the observation method. In recent cases, along with its com-
promise on fair value, the Court has been more liberal toward the age-life
method. An age-life computation was sustained in the Schuylkill Valley
Lines case, 249 and a judgment figure of 38 per cent, between estimated
observed depreciation of 27.9 per cent and the book reserve of 42.5 per
cent, was approved in the Blue Mountain case.
250
Depreciation as Amortization of Cost-Book Reserve.-Although the
Commission has at times used the book reserve as a measure of loss in
value,25 1 the main function of the reserve is to show the amortization of
cost. This was recognized in the Peoples case and the reserve was applied
in determining net book value, but the reserve had no part in the final rate
base.252 However, in the Manufacturers case the Commission took a fur-
ther step towards a prudent investment rate base. Accrued depreciation
was determined by the ratio of the retirement reserve to the depreciable
book cost,2 8 following a method advocated by Commissioner Buchanan
in the California case.254 While the result reached does not reflect the
true amortized investment which can be determined only by the deduction
of the actual reserve, it does reflect the percentage of the investment that
should have been amortized. By this method the investor does not suffer
from the excessive charges made in the past and the consumer does not
get a windfall; he pays what he would have had to pay had the prior regu-
lation been proper. The Manufacturers case stands as a unique incident
in the history of the Public Utility Commission. Because of the Court's
opinion in the Peoples case no further experiments were made with de-
preciation as amortization of cost. Although the decision has been re-
versed by implication, the question has never been directly passed upon by
the Superior Court.
2 5
CONCLUSION
At present, fair value under the Public Utility Law appears to be a
synthesis of reproduction cost at average prices and original cost, less a
judgment estimate of'loss in value. The merits of such a rate base are at
least open to question. Certainly a prudent investment rate base would
249. Schuylkill Valley Lines v. PUC, 165 Pa. Super. 393, 401-402, 68 A.2d
448, 453 (1949).
250. Blue Mountain Tel. & Tel. Co. v. P.U.C. 165 Pa. Super. 320, 326-327,
69 A.2d 441, 443-445 (1949).
251. PUC v. California Water Co., 21 Pa. P.U.C. 770, 786-789 (1940).
252. PUC v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., supra note 123, at 581-584. The re-
serve after adjustment was $29,414,196. The depreciation deducted from original
cost was $26,252,863.
253. PUC v. Manufacturers Light & Heat Co., supra note 125, at 446-452.
254. PUC v. California Water Co., supra note 251 at 793-794 (dissenting
opinion).
255. See Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. PUC, supra note 129, at 491, 34 A.2d at
383.
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make for greater administrative efficiency.256 However, there are certain
considerations which favor reproduction cost. The popular argument
stems from the fact that the purchasing power of the dollar fluctuates;
reproduction cost rate bases are said to give a return on approximately the
purchasing power invested. A more subtle argument depends on the
theory that under competitive conditions rates would be based on the cost
of reproducing the service.2 7 On the other hand, the advocates of prudent
investment point to the advantages of integrated regulation and to the
fact that the investor makes no sacrifice. He may not get competitive
profits, but he gets a steady return, high enough to attract more capital,
on the money which actually benefits the public.2 18 For better or for
worse, most of the country has adopted prudent investment; Pennsylvania
belongs to a minority of nine states which still require reproduction cost
evidence.
259
The Problem of the Obsolete Utility.-In his dissent in the Hope
case, Justice Jackson argued strongly against the use of any rate base at
all. He admitted that the prudent investment theory worked well under
some circumstances, but he declared that it has "no rational application
where there is no such relationship between the investment and the capacity
to serve." 260 Some utilities today have, through the development of other
types of service, lost the ability to support their investment by the service
being rendered. These utilities have reached the point of maximum rates.
If rates are raised, the use of the service will drop, with the result that the
revenue is no greater, and perhaps less than before.26' The present situa-
tion of the PTC indicates that street railways are at least approaching
the position of obsolete utilities. Since the 1942 rate case, rising wages as
well as higher operating costs have forced the PTC on five different
occasions to seek increased rates.2 2  The Superior Court has twice sus-
256. See TRoxELL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 299-300.
257. See 2 BONBRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 11, at 1086-1089. The argument that
the cost of reproducing the service should be the measure of fair value assumes that
reproduction cost is the cost of reproducing an efficient modern plant rather than a
plant substantially identical with the old one, while the legal concept is based on
the identical plant notion. See BAUER ANID GoLw, op. cit. sura note 1, at 155-172.
258. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. P.S.C., 262 U.S. 276, 306-310 (1923)
(dissenting opinion). See also 2 BONMiGHT, op. cit. supra note 11, at 1084-1086;
TROXELL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 300-301; TRACHsEi, op. cit. supra note 104, at
285-286.
259. TRASCnEL, op. ci. supra note 104, at 282.
260. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., supra note 40, at 649 (dissenting opinion).
Justice Jackson was thinking of the differences in amount of capital that might be
invested to get the same amount of natural gas.
261. See TRoXELi, op. cit. supra note 1 at 25-44. Inelasticity of demand is
disappearing in fields where other types of service are available. For example, water
companies must keep their rates relatively low in rural areas because of the con-
sumer's opportunity to have a private artesian well drilled. Since 1945, the Com-
mission has found it unnecessary to make a finding of fair value in over half of its
cases. See, e.g., PUC v. North Penn Gas Co., 25 Pa. P.U.C. 319 (1945); PUC
v. Longacre Park Heating Co., 26 Pa. P.U.C. 176 (1946); PUC v. Phillips Gas
& Oil Co., 26 Pa. P.U.C. 325 (1947).
262. See Philadelphia Inquirer, November 30, 1950, p. 10, col. 6.
tained increases, 26 and two more cases have been before the Commission. 264
In the first three of these cases, there was no finding of fair value; the
Commission indicated late in 1949 that the fair return on fair value
formula was of little practical significance in dealing with the PTC.26s
The latest case, decided just as this Note was being prepared for publi-
cation, would seem to indicate a retreat from this position. The Commis-
sion allowed a 6.5 per cent return on a valuation of $93,000,000. How-
ever, this figure can hardly be said to represent the present fair value of
the system. The PTC submitted various measures of value including a
depreciated original cost of $109,686,000 and depreciated reproduction
cost estimates based on both five-year average and spot prices ranging
from $164,802,000 to $213,505,000. The Commission stated that it was
not convinced that any of these estimates should be taken at face value
and adopted the figure found as fair value by the Superior Court in 1944.266
The present order should prevent deficit operations and provide some re-
turn for the shareholders, at least until the margin of profit is wiped out
by further wage increases. 267  Yet in the battle over the finances of the
PTC, the interests of the public, the employees, and the investors are in
conflict. Ultimately the interests of one of these groups must be subordi-
nated and it would seem that it will be, as it has been in the past, the in-
vestors who lose. Relief for them is subject to the delays inherent in rate
proceedings 2 8 and to the rising sentiment that conditions do not warrant
giving them a return on their investment.269 Under such circumstances,
the Superior Court's concept of fair value becomes meaningless. The
Constitution and the law merely prevent confiscation; they do not guaran-
tee a fair return.
2 70
263. Philadelphia v. PUC, 162 Pa. Super. 425, 57 A.2d 613 (1948) ; Philadelphia
v. PUC, 164 Pa. Super. 96, 63 A.2d 691 (1949).
264. Philadelphia v. PTC, Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, September
28, 1949; Philadelphia v. PTC, November 28, 1950 (Chairman Siggins and Com-
missioner Houck dissented).
265. Philadelphia v. PTC, Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, September
28, 1949.
266. Philadelphia v. PTC, Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, November
28, 1950. The closest figure to fair value as adopted is net book cost of $89,428,000,
which was rejected as a measure of value in Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. PUC,
supra note 129 at 485, 34 A.2d at 381.
267. Demands for further wage increases are already being made. See Phila-
delphia Inquirer, November 30, 1950, p. 10, col. 6.
268. The tariff schedule in the 1950 case was filed on February 10. The de-
cision was handed down exactly eight months and 18 days later.
269. Both the Philadelphia Suburban Transportation Co. and the Philadelphia
& Western R. R., which connect with the PTC at the 69th Street Terminal, filed
complaints in the 1950 case alleging that the proposed tariff would divert traffic
which would normally use their systems and the Market Street Subway-Elevated
line of the PTC to private automobiles or other carriers. The implication is that
the fare increase will bring about reduced revenues for the PTC as well as the
connecting carriers. See also text at note 265 supra.
270. Market Street Ry. v. Railroad Commission, 324 U.S. 548, 567 (1945):
"The due process clause . . . cannot be applied to . . . restore values that have
been lost by the operation of economic forces." The rate base used was $7,950,000,
although book value was $41,000,000 and estimated historical cost was $25,000,000.
19501 NOTE
406 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99
Most utilities have not as yet been forced to consider the problem.
Despite the rise in costs, they enjoy a sufficiently monopolistic position to
be able to earn a fair return on their investment and perhaps a bit more.
Their revenues must be regulated by law rather than economics, and legal
rate regulation calls for a balancing of interests. The Commission has
indicated that the policy behind regulation is to make the consumer pay
no more than what is just and reasonable.271 To this end, it has at least
twice attempted to use prudent investment, on the theory that the in-
vestor's property has not been confiscated if the capital he contributed
is kept intact.27 2 Twice the Superior Court has refused to accept this
interpretation of the act,273 although it has moved away from reproduc-
tion cost in view of the price rise in recent years.,27 4 Yet the act has never
been construed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.27 5 It is submitted
that the interests of the consumer in the present era of high prices demand
a further attempt to establish prudent investment, insofar as possible, as
the rate-making law of Pennsylvania.
Edward Ross Carpenter.
271. Cf. PUC v. Solar Elec. Co., supra note 84, at 389-390.
272. Note 83, supra; note 125, supra.
273. Solar Elec. Co. v. PUC, supra note 51; Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. PUC,
supra note 129.
274. Equitable Gas Co. v. PUC, 160 Pa. Super. 458, 467, 51 A.2d 497, 502
(1947).
275. Review by the Supreme Court is provided for in the Act. PA. STAT. ANN.,
tit. 66, § 1439 (Purdon, 1941).
